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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Extend Commodiy Exchange Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and Credit
of the House Comm on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House
Hearings];
Agriculture, Rural Development and RelatedAgencies Appropriationsfor 1979: Hearings Before
a SubcomnL of the Comn on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978
House Appropriation Hearings];
Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Agricultural Research and Genera/Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutri-
tion and Forestry, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Hearings];
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the
House Comm on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 House
Hearings];
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agricul-
ture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Hearings];
Hearings on HR. 6772 to Amend the Grain Futures Act Before the Senate Comm on Agricul-
ture and Forestry, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) [hereinafter cited as 1936 Hearings];
RECOMMENDED POLICIES ON COMMODITY OPTION TRANSACTIONS: REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON THE DEFINITION AND REGULATION OF MARKET INSTRUMENTS TO THE
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (July 6, 1976) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT];
P. MEHL, TRADING IN PRIVILEGES ON THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE (U.S. Dep't of Agri-
culture Cir. No. 323, 1934) [hereinafter cited as MEHL];
Long, Commodity Options Revisited, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Long];
W. Baumol, Commodity Options: On Their Contribution to the Economy (Sept. 1973) [here-
inafter cited as Baumol];
L. Kendall, The Chicago Board of Trade and the Federal Government: A Study of Their
Relationship, 1848 to 1952 (1956) (unpublished dissertation on fie at Univ. of Indiana Business
School) [hereinafter cited as Kendall];
J. Lurie, The Chicago Board of Trade, 1874-1905, and the Development of Certain Rules and
Regulations Governing Its Operation (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Wis., on file in
library of Chicago Board of Trade) [hereinafter cited as Lurie].
1. The Commission was created by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976) (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17b (1970)).
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ity option trading2 in the United States. Used in conjunction with the
commodity futures markets,3 commodity options have been criticized
by many as nothing more than aleatory contracts used to wager on
2. The commodity option is, in theory, no different from the more familiar types of option
contracts relating to real estate, securities or personal services. Essentially, an option is a right that
is purchased by the option holder entitling him either to buy from or to sell to the grantor of the
option the subject of the option at a stated price and within a stated time. In the case of a com-
modity option, the right pertains to an underlying physical commodity (such as a specific quantity
of gold, a train carload of coffee, etc.) or to a commodity futures contract relating to that commod-
ity. The price paid for the option right is referred to as the "premium," and the price at which the
option purchaser is entitled to buy or sell the underlying commodity or futures contract is referred
to as the "striking price." "Exercise" is the decision of an option holder to require performance by
the grantor of his obligation with respect to the underlying commodity or futures contract. The
period during which an option may be exercised is specified in the contract and may range from
one day to as long as 18 months. The "exercise date" or "expiration date" is the final day on
which the option holder may exercise the option.
If the option entitles its holder to purchase the underlying commodity or futures contract
from the grantor, it is referred to as a "call" option. If the object of the call option is a futures
contract, this means that upon exercise of the option, the grantor will sell the futures contract to
the grantee. In the terminology of futures trading, the option grantor thus would take a "short" or
seller's position and the option holder would take a "long" or buyer's position under the futures
contract. If, on the other hand, the option holder has the right to sell the underlying commodity or
futures contract to the grantor, it is referred to as a "put" option. If the object of the put option is
a futures contract, this means that upon exercise, the grantor has agreed to purchase a futures
contract (and takes a "long" or buyer's position) from the grantee (who takes a "short" or seller's
position).
There is a third type of commodity option contract which represents a combination of the call
and put options described above. This is the "double option" which allows the grantee at his
election either to buy from or to sell to the grantor (but not both) the underlying commodity or
futures contract at a single striking price. The double option allows its holder to benefit from
either a rise or a fall in prices of the underlying commodity. However, because it is really two
options in one contract, the premium is usually twice that of the separate put or call contract.
Such options are used when the trader expects high price volatilify, but is unsure which way the
prices will move. See Cornish, Types of Trading, in GETTING STARTED IN LONDON COMMODI-
TIES 29 (2d ed. 1975).
3. Although not all commodity options are related to an underlying futures contract, it is
still important to understand the relationship between the two. A futures contract is a standard-
ized agreement for future delivery of a specified quantity of a commodity during a specific future
delivery month. Such contracts are traded in the designated areas or "pits" of the commodity
futures exchanges or boards of trade where the price of each contract is determined between buy-
ers and sellers at public outcry. Once a transaction is completed, both parties are bound to per-
form in accordance with the terms of the contract.
While a commodity futures contract constitutes a mutual obligation under which the seller of
a contract is obligated to sell the underlying commodity and the purchaser of the contract is obli-
gated to purchase that commodity at the stated price and time, an option constitutes a unilateral
contract-only the grantor has a binding obligation to perform. The option holder, on the other
hand, may choose to exercise the option or not, depending upon whether it becomes economically
advantageous for him to do so. Since the premium paid is a separate payment and does not
constitute a credit against the striking price, an option holder will not break even on his invest-
ment unless the price of the underlying commodity or futures contract moves favorably by at least
the amount of the premium plus commissions. If the price does move favorably, the holder will
probably choose to exercise the option, thereby requiring the grantor to fulfill the terms of the
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commodity price changes.4  However, this attitude ignores the legiti-
mate economic benefits that theoretically can accrue from commodity
option trading. By generating empirical evidence that will reveal the
true function of options in commodity trading and whether they serve
any purpose not currently provided by futures trading, the proposed
pilot program should ideally furnish the CFTC with a basis for deter-
mining whether trading in commodity options on domestic exchanges
in the United States should be permanently established. However, the
program has two basic problems in its current state. First, it is highly
questionable whether the program's restrictions on options will allow
them to demonstrate their true economic benefit. Second, the CFTC
has not yet developed standards to review the empirical data to be col-
lected by the program. This Article addresses both of these problems.
The Article will first discuss federal efforts to regulate commodity
option trading-the most recent such effort culminating in the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.1 It will then focus
on this Act, paying particular attention to the activities of the in-
dependent commission created thereunder and to the reasons that led
that Commission to impose an absolute ban on option trading as of
June 1, 1978.6 Third, the Article will review the proposed pilot pro-
gram to determine whether it is designed to provide an accurate ap-
contract. Even if the price moves favorably by only 25 or 30% of his premium amount, an option
holder will probably exercise the option to recoup that portion of his expenditure. If a call option
is exercised, the option grantor must sell to the holder the specified commodity or futures contract
for the striking price. In the case of a put option, the option grantor must buy the underlying
commodity or futures contract from the option holder and must pay the specified striking price.
In addition, there are a number of important practical distinctions between commodity op-
tions and commodity futures contracts. For example, when a party enters into a futures contract,
whether he is a buyer or seller of that contract, he is required by the exchange on which the
contract is traded to post margin deposits to guarantee his performance under the contract. When
the market price of the particular futures contract changes during subsequent trading by more
than a certain amount, the exchange and/or its clearinghouse will call for additional deposits,
often referred to as a "maintenance margin," to be made by the party against whom the price has
moved. Such adjustments are made on a daily basis throughout the life of each futures contract.
An option contract, on the other hand, involves no obligation to make additional margin deposits
in the event of adverse price changes. The option purchaser pays a premium at the time of
purchase, but undertakes no risk of margin calls. If adverse price changes occur, the option holder
merely fails to exercise his option. Unlike the holder of a futures contract, the option holder bears
a risk of loss limited to the amount paid as option premium. This limitation of risk, in fact, is the
factor that has made-options very popular with small investors in the 1970s. For a discussion of
margin requirements for futures trading, see CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING
MANUAL 27-30, 128-30 (1977).
4. See, e.g., 1978 House Hearings 508 (statement of Linly R. Stum).
5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
6. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,153 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.11).
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praisal of the potential economic benefits of option trading. The
Article then offers suggestions for streamlining the program so that
data gathering will not be impeded. Finally, it will suggest appropriate
standards for evaluating the empirical evidence generated by the pro-
gram and for determining whether the Commission should permit the
regulated trading to continue on a permanent basis.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF COMMODITY OPTION TRADING
For 100 years, ever since the appearance of privilege trading on
the floor of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (Chicago Board
of Trade),7 the commodity trading industry has alternately avoided and
been subjected to state and federal regulation. In the absence of such
regulation, the industry became susceptible to abusive practices and
manipulations, both imagined and real. Recurrent scandals led to the
passage of the Commodity Exchange Act' of 1936, in which Congress
enacted ostensibly comprehensive legislation which cured the evils of
option trading by banning it. For some thirty years, Congress had ap-
parently succeeded. However, in the early 1970s, hybrid forms of com-
modity option trading that were outside the scope of any regulation
appeared. True to their heritage, these unregulated options proved
subject to abuse. In 1974, Congress amended the 1936 Act to eliminate
these abuses.
In addition to expanding the scope of regulation of option and
futures trading, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
19749 created the CFTC. Congress charged the Commission with de-
termining the fate of commodity option trading on domestic exchanges
in the United States.'" To understand fully this congressional mandate,
7. See MEHL 5. Privilege trading became popular among traders during the volatile mar-
kets of the early 1860s. They appear to have been used as a form of "hedging," whereby the
holder of a futures position with a substantial risk of adverse price movement could limit that risk
by obtaining the right to dispose of the position at a fixed price. Lurie 3 1.
Despite their popularity, privileges apparently were already subject to controversy by 1865.
As described by an early historian of the Board of Trade, the rules of the exchange adopted in
1865 made specific mention of trading in privileges:
What are known as "puts" and "calls" were discountenanced by the closing para-
graph of Rule XI, which ran as follows: "Privileges bought or sold to deliver or call for
grain or other property by members of the Association shall not be recognized as a busi-
ness transaction by the Directors or Committee of Arbitration." Dealing in these privi-
leges, however, though not recognized, does not appear to have been forbidden.
C. TAYLOR, HISTORY OF THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 332 (1917). This
provision was eliminated from the rules of the Board by 1869, MEHL 5.
8. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)).
9. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
10. Several additional responsibilities of the Commission are mentioned in the text accompa-
nying notes 73-74 infra.
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one must begin with the 1936 Act-not only because the 1974 legisla-
tion was an amendment of that Act, but also because many of the con-
cerns expressed prior to the 1936 Act remained and in part set the stage
for the 1974 enactment.
A. The Beginnings of Federal Regulation.
Trading in commodity options has had a centuries-long, turbulent
history."I Its first appearance in the United States occurred in the mid-
nineteenth century when options developed as an adjunct to the grain
futures markets. Privileges, a form of commodity options, were held in
disrepute by everyone except those futures traders who employed them.
These options gained an early reputation as gambling contracts, unnec-
essary to the functioning of the marketplace and used only to place bets
on expected price changes.
As early as the 1860s, the directors of the Chicago Board of Trade
undertook to regulate the trading of privileges. The directors alter-
nately banned and permitted the practice as internal political battles
raged between the floor traders and the officials responsible for the or-
derly functioning of the futures markets. The directors' attempts at
regulation were doomed from the start. The widespread use of privi-
leges among the membership combined with the predisposition of most
traders to ignore or resist regulation to make it impossible for the direc-
tors to control the practice.' 2 Attempts at self-regulation failed, but the
controversy did not end.
In the 1870s, the issue of controlling abuses in option trading even-
tually found its way to a higher forum. Major political battles raged in
the Illinois legislature between anti-option farmers and pro-option
traders and businessmen.'3 Even though the farm bloc was successful
in having regulatory laws passed, this attempt at state regulation like-
11. For example, frenzied trading and speculation in tulip futures and options developed in
Holland during the 1630s. See A. REINACH, THE NATURE OF PUTS AND CALLS 35-39 (1961). As
the speculation pushed the price of tulip bulbs skyward, bulbs were sold on central markets in
stock exchanges, and clubs were formed at local taverns to buy and sell them. Rainbolt, Regulat-
ing the Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1977). Belatedly, the Dutch
government attempted to regulate the market, id., but lacking any mechanism such as a clearing-
house or the protection of security deposits to back up the option and futures contracts, the market
prices rose out of control and a crash was inevitable. A. REINACH, supra, at 38-39. The regulation
did no more than make the process of boom and bust "a bit more orderly." Rainbolt, supra, at 5.
See generally Berger, "Tulipomonia" Was No Dutch Treat to Gambling Burghers, 8 SMITHSONIAN,
April, 1977, at 1, 70-76.
12. See generally Lurie 31.
13. M. PowERS, GErTING STARTED IN COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 195 (1977).
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wise proved ineffective-first, because it was difficult to draw a valid
distinction between the legitimate and acceptable trading of futures
and the unsavory privilege business'4 and, second, because the laws
were generally ignored by grain traders.
Economic developments, which brought reduced prices for farm
crops, caused farmers to take their case against options to Congress in
the early 1890s. t5 Because of their inability to distinguish between the
options that farmers sought to ban and the futures contracts that the
exchanges fought hard to protect, the legislators several times failed to
enact any sort of regulation. But congressional efforts did not end
there.
Sentiment against option trading continued to run high, and Con-
gress repeatedly attempted to find some appropriate means of regula-
tion. In the Future Trading Act 16 of 1921, Congress attempted to
legislate privileges (options) out of existence by imposing a prohibitive
tax.17 Further congressional efforts to regulate the futures exchanges
culminated in the Grain Futures Act 18 of 1922--the first comprehen-
sive federal effort to regulate futures trading on the exchanges. This
statute required the exchanges and their members to maintain records
and to file reports and authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to con-
duct investigations of exchange operations. While the Act did not
speak specifically to commodity option trading, it did require ex-
changes to prevent price manipulation and the cornering of mar-
kets 19-activities in which option trading could and often did play a
role. An exchange that failed to comply with these requirements was
subject to suspension or revocation of its contract market designation.20
Imposition of this penalty would put the exchange out of business be-
cause trading in futures contracts was permitted only on a designated
exchange. These restrictions, in combination with the tax, caused op-
tions to disappear from the exchanges until the tax was found unconsti-
tutional in 1926.21
14. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.
15. Lurie 131.
16. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921). Section 3 of this statute was ruled unconstitutional in Trusler
v. Crooks, 269 U.S. 475 (1926); section 4 "and the regulations of the act interwoven within it" were
earlier declared unconstitutional. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 72 (1922). Sections 6 and 13 were
later repealed. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8(c), 80 Stat. 645.
17. 1936 Hearings 221 (quoting Future Trading in Grain: Hearings on H.!? 11843 Beore the
Senate Comm. on Agriculture andForestry, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1921) (statement of Julius H.
Barnes)).
18. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)).
19. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 4(d), 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
20. Id. § 6(a).
21. Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U.S. 475 (1926).
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Immediately after the Supreme Court struck down the tax im-
posed by the Future Trading Act of 1921, privilege trading again be-
came very popular on the Chicago Board of Trade. While no complete
statistics were kept, it has been estimated that the volume of trading in
privileges in wheat was equivalent to approximately fifteen percent of
the volume of trading done in wheat futures on the Chicago Board of
Trade.22 As with most activity in the Roaring Twenties, option trading
was frenetic.
B. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.
The Great Depression brought about renewed suspicion of the ex-
changes. Speculative short selling in the futures market was blamed for
depressed agricultural prices. During July 19 to 20, 1933, the wheat
market collapsed, and privilege trading was blamed as the cause.23
Spurred on by these developments, Congress once again acted. The
resulting Commodity Exchange Act24 of 1936 sounded the death knell
for option trading. As of June 15, 1936, commodity option trading was
banned with respect to all commodities then regulated under the Act.
2 5
22. MEHL 101.
23. 1936 Hearings 224. See also 1974 House Hearings 192-93 (statement of Glenn Willett
Clark). At the depth of the Depression in 1932, wheat prices reached a 300-year low. Kendall
282. Trading volume on the futures markets diminished to an extremely low level, and the market
generally was a place of psychological depression.
Beginning in early 1933, however, the price of wheat began a rapid climb due to a strong new
confidence among investors. A number of factors contributed to the surge-traders were inspired
by the new administration in Washington, there was a growing fear of inflation and traders gener-
ally felt that things could not get much worse. Between January and mid-July of that year, the
price of wheat rose from 45 cents to $1.17 per bushel. Unfortunately, the euphoria was short-
lived. On July 19 and 20, 1933, the price of wheat collapsed, declining 27.5 cents per bushel. See
generally Kendall 282.
The Grain Futures Administration (GFA), which was the federal agency created in 1922 to
regulate the exchanges, instituted an immediate study to determine the causes of this crash. Its
report blamed the activities of ten large traders on the Exchange. GFA ANNUAL REPORT 3
(1934). The Administrator then sought new legislation to supplement the Grain Futures Act
which would grant the GFA authority to limit speculative lines, to license merchants and brokers
on the exchanges and to take action to prohibit cheating and fraud in the marketplace. In large
part, this initiative by the Administrator provided the impetus for the extensive scrutiny of the
futures exchanges which esulted in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.
According to a rec rt prepared by the Department of Agriculture, the wheat market crash of
1933 "again led th, /exchanges to seize upon trading in indemnities as one of the evils of future
trading that should be abolished." See 1974 House Hearings 192 (statement of Dr. Henry Jarecki).
By the time of the 1936 hearings, many of the exchanges had again passed resolutions prohibiting
option trading.
24. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491(1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)).
25. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 4,49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §
6 (1976)). Interestingly, the legislative history behind the 1936 Act reveals no great controversy or
analysis of the effects of option trading on the futures markets. 1974 House Hearings 193 (state-
ment of Dr. Henry Jarecki). In testimony before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and For-
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The 1936 Act divided regulation of the futures markets between
the federal government and the exchanges. 26 Besides the absolute ban
on all forms of commodity option trading27 in certain enumerated com-
modities,2" the Act provided a system of qualification, registration and
recordkeeping for the exchanges and for dealers and brokers operating
through those exchanges. 29 Finally, the Act added criminal sanctions
for actual or attempted price manipulation of commodity prices.3 0
With the exception of amendments adding new commodities to the
list of those regulated under the original Act,3 ' the Commodity Ex-
change Act stood virtually undisturbed for over thirty-five years. In the
early 1970s, however, a combination of explosive growth in certain un-
regulated commodity options and drastic developments in world agri-
cultural markets caused Congress to review the federal regulation of
commodity futures and option trading.32 This review resulted in the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.
C. The Reemergence of Commodity Option Trading.
In 1970, a keen interest in commodity options resurfaced. The in-
terest was the result of very active trading in so-called "world commod-
estry, the spokesman for the Department of Agriculture who had only recently authored the
comprehensive study of privilege trading on the Chicago Board of Trade made no recommenda-
tion regarding the proposed ban on option activity. Rather, he presented an outline of the views
that previously had been expressed by the grain exchanges themselves. Instead of making a case
to support the ban, he merely pointed out that the grain exchanges all supported the prohibition.
1936 Hearings 219-20.
Perhaps because there was no organized opposition to the ban in 1936, no analysis was made
of the economic effects of privilege trading, and no data were presented to support the allegation
of abuses in trading the contracts. Privileges and indemnities were merely lumped together in the
1936 Act with "wash sales," "cross trades," "accommodation trades" and other "transactions
found to lend themselves to cheating or fraudulent practices." Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545,
sec. 5, § 4c, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1976)).
26. Indeed, one commentator has characterized the system of regulation established by the
1936 Act as one of "strong exchange self-regulation with weak federal oversight." Rainbolt, supra
note 11, at I 1 (emphasis in original).
27. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, sec. 5, § 4c(B), 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
28. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) ("The word 'commodity'
shall mean wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter,
eggs and Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes)").
29. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 5, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
30. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 9, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
31. Wool tops were added in 1938, Act of April 7, 1938, ch. 108, 52 Stat. 205; fats, oils,
cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans and soybean meal were added in 1940, Act of Oct.
9, 1940, ch. 786, 54 Stat. 1059; and livestock, livestock products, Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-258, 82 Stat. 26, and frozen concentrated orange juice, Act of July 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-418,
82 Stat. 413 were added in 1968. Trading in onion futures was prohibited in 1958, Act of Aug. 28,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-839, 72 Stat. 1013.
32. See text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
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ities"-for example, silver, platinum, copper, coffee, cocoa and
sugar-that began to attract the attention of a number of American
firms interested in fashioning new investment possibilities in those
commodities. The American firms quickly discovered that there was a
gap in the coverage of the Commodity Exchange Act ban on options.
Since the Act governed only certain enumerated domestic commodi-
ties, 33 it did not prohibit the sale of options in the "world commodi-
ties."34 Spurred on by the sudden volatility of prices in the London
commodities, a new industry quickly emerged in the United States to
offer options on those commodities to the American public. This re-
newed activity employed three different hybrids of the well-known
commodity option: London options, naked options and dealer or Mo-
catta options.
1. London Options. The first type of option to evolve outside
the scope of the 1936 Act was the so-called "London option." While
this term has been used recently in something of a generic sense, the
term actually refers to those options traded on the seven major ex-
changes in London.
Trading in options on the London exchanges has been conducted
33. See notes 28 & 31 supra.
34. For examples of "world commodities," see note 35 infra.
35. Five of these exchanges handle what are often collectively referred to as the "soft com-
modities": wool, cocoa, sugar, coffee and vegetable oil. Futures and option transactions on these
exchanges are cleared by a common clearinghouse, known as the International Commodity Clear-
ing House (ICCH), which is an independent, privately owned subsidiary of the United Dominion
Trust, an English banking group.
Trading on the five exchanges in the ICCH group is conducted by public auction among the
trading members of each exchange. Once the terms of an option contract have been established
on the floor of the exchange, the exchange obtains a verification from both parties to the trade and
forwards a record of the transaction to the ICCH for clearing. The clearinghouse then collects a
margin deposit from the grantor of the option to insure performance by the grantor if the option is
exercised. The clearinghouse also collects and holds the premium paid by the purchaser. The
premium is held in a special account and is not released to the grantor until the option expires, is
exercised or is abandoned by the holder. The ICCH actually becomes a party to the transaction,
issuing a "seller's contract" to the grantor of the option and a "taker's contract" to the purchaser
of the option. By these means, the clearinghouse itself takes responsibility for performance by
both parties. This obligation of the London clearinghouse (often referred to as the clearinghouse
"guaranty") is backed by ICCH capitalization which consists of approximately $8.5 million in
assets.
The conduct of option trading is very different on two other major London exchanges. In the
case of the London Rubber Exchange, trading is conducted by private negotiations among mem-
ber brokers. This exchange has been described as little more than a meeting place where exchange
members can negotiate their trades. It does maintain a settlement house, but it is operated in a
different manner from that of the ICCH. The settlement house registers contracts negotiated be-
tween two of its members without becoming a party to the transaction. All option contracts are
issued directly by a grantor to the taker. There is no clearinghouse "guaranty" of any of the
contracts, and the premium paid by a purchaser is immediately turned over to the grantor. There
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for decades by respectable, financially sound firms. Prior to 1970, most
of the option trading on the London exchanges was done by commer-
cial interests that utilized options to lock in a price for future produc-
tion or to guard against increases in the cost of anticipated needs for a
particular commodity.36 The integrity of most London options is
backed by clearinghouse guaranties or, in the case of the London Metal
Exchange, by the financial strength of the ring-dealing members who
issue the contracts. Thus, by giving options the same respectability as
futures contracts and by providing the same safeguards available for
futures contracts, the London exchanges have been able to make op-
tions available to investors without any major difficulties.
Although option trading proceeded without difficulty on the
London exchanges, the image of London options was tarnished by the
manner in which they were marketed in this country prior to the 1978
ban on trading.37 Since the London exchange members did not have
offices in the United States to sell options, American option purchasers
were forced to deal with an American brokerage firm. Upon receipt of
a customer order, such a firm would contact a member of the appropri-
ate London exchange for the purpose of purchasing an option. That
exchange member would then enter into the option contract with an-
other member of his exchange.38 In most cases, the exchange would
require the posting of a margin deposit by the grantor and would hold
the purchaser's premium.39
The problem for the American customer in these transactions was
that the protection of clearinghouse guaranties, together with any mar-
gin deposits and segregated premiums, extended only to the exchange
member in London and not to the American customer. In the event of
a default on the option contract, the customer's only recourse was
is a requirement, however, that the grantor post margin deposits to insure performance in the
event of an exercise of the option.
Finally, on the London Metal Exchange (LME), option trading is conducted in an open auc-
tion market on the floor of the exchange. The only firms allowed on the trading floor are the
thirty-six firms known as "ring dealers." Other firms who are members of the exchange must
conduct all of their trading through one of these thirty-six ring dealers. The LME does allow "off-
exchange" trading, and much of the option trading is conducted in this manner, with the parties
privately negotiating the premium to be paid. The exchange does not maintain a settlement or
clearinghouse and does not itself register or issue option contracts. Trading on the LME does not
carry with it any guaranty of performance, and no margin requirements are imposed on option
grantors. The exchange encourages its members to require margin deposits and to escrow premi-
ums, but there is no requirement that these procedures be followed. See generally Long 111-24.
36. See 1974 House Hearings 179 (statement of Maurice Stockdale).
37. See text accompanying notes 83-97 infra.
38. Long 124.
39. Both grantor margins and the holding of premiums are required only in the case of
ICCH-cleared option transactions. Id. 113. See note 35 supra.
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against the American firm with which he had dealt. Moreover, the
American customer paid an amount greater than the premium required
to purchase the option in London. In addition to the premium, he also
paid commissions, directly or indirectly, to the American broker and to
the London broker. In many cases there might have been additional
brokers in the chain between the customer and the exchange member
who actually bought his option on the London exchange.4"
It is more accurate to say that what the American customer
purchased from his broker was not a London option, but an obligation
from the American firm to enter into a contract on the customer's be-
half with another broker who was a member of the London exchange,
who in turn agreed to enter into an option transaction for the account
of the American broker. The London exchange member did not have
any record of the particular customer involved, and the customer was
not an actual party to the option contract. Thus, the United States cus-
tomer had only a contractual obligation from his broker to pay the cus-
tomer a certain amount of money if the market moved in his favor.
[I]n a very real sense the brokerage client is making an investment in
the general assets of the broker with the expectation that the broker
will use that money in such a way as to generate sufficient income so
that he will be able to pay the client his profit as determined by an
independent factor, the London market, upon exercise of his op-
41tion.
The difficulty with this situation for the customer was that he had no
way of knowing whether his option had actually been purchased by his
broker. Even if his option had been obtained and the market had
moved in his favor, he was forced to rely upon the solvency of his bro-
ker for payment of any gain. If his broker went bankrupt, the customer
had no means of recovering from the margin deposits or segregated
premiums in London, except as a general creditor of the broker. Thus,
when dealing in such options, the customer/optionee faced substantial
risks--especially in light of the fact that his brokers were free of all
regulation 42
2. Naked Options. Another type of "commodity option" that
emerged in the early 1970s was the "naked" option. Beginning in 1971,
the firm of Goldstein-Samuelson, Inc. began marketing what it called
40. Moreover, some dealers took unfair advantage of unsophisticated investors by charging
excessive markups. For example, reports indicated that Lloyd Carr & Co. was selling an option
for $6,360.00 when other dealers were offering it for only $1,800.00. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at
41, col. I.
41. Long 127.
42. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
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commodity options to the public. Implementing sales techniques mas-
terminded by Harold Goldstein, the firm promoted the sale of these
options with extensive advertising and hard-sell or "boiler room" tac-
tics. 4 3 Starting with an initial capitalization of $800 in 1971, the firm
exploded into a network of offices throughout the United States and
abroad with gross income by the end of 1972 estimated at $45 million.44
Spurred on by this success, dozens of other firms appeared virtually
overnight to help reap the bounty. It is estimated that "commodity op-
tion" sales had become a $200 to $300 million per year industry by
February 1973.45
While London options had been available in the United States
through the older, established commodity brokers prior to that time,
Goldstein was the first to begin selling options with mass marketing
techniques. Those efforts were directed at small, unsophisticated inves-
tors who knew little or nothing about the commodity markets and the
complex futures trading industry.
Unlike transactions in London options, where a member of one of
the London exchanges actually obtains an option contract and "sells" it
through a series of brokers, the naked option involved no connection
with the London exchanges. While the customer was led to believe that
he was purchasing a London option, the contract was never obtained.46
Thus, in reality, the customer purchased merely a promise by the firm
to pay a sum of money determined by price movements on the appro-
priate London exchange. Such options are considered "naked" in the
sense that they were not backed by an actual futures contract or physi-
cal inventory held by a member of an exchange, and no margin depos-
its or segregated premiums were available to insure payment of any
gain to the customer.47
Goldstein-Samuelson claimed that it was hedging its option obli-
gations in the market by purchasing futures contracts for the firm ac-
count. However, rather than obtaining a futures contract for each
option sold, they likened their hedging to the cash reserve maintained
by a bank or insurance company on the theory that only a certain per-
43. The term "boiler room" has been used to describe offices that set up large banks of tele-
phones from which option salesmen made thousands of unsolicited, high-pressure telephone calls
to unsophisticated members of the general public. See Complaint at 4-5, CFTC v. Carr, Civ. No.
G77-550CA5 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
44. Note, FederalLegislation/or Commodity Option Trading: A Proposal, 47 S. CAL. L. REv.
1418, 1426 (1974).
45. Id.
46. See Long, The Naked Commodiy Option Contract as a Security, 15 WM. & MARY L.
Rnv. 211, 211-12 (1973).
47. Id.
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centage of contracts would result in payments being owed to custom-
ers.48 However, the fact was that no hedging was actually undertaken,
and the obligation to pay customers was supported solely by the inade-
quate capitalization of the company plus the cash flow generated by
further option sales to other customers. The arrangement was reminis-
cent of the "bucket shops" of an earlier age wherein commodity bro-
kers merely took the other side of a transaction from their customers
and, in effect, wagered that the market prices would move in their
favor.49 It was destined to fail because, as in other "pyramid" schemes,
an ever-increasing number of customer sales was necessary to keep the
business operating for any length of time.
During the initial stages of the bullish commodity markets of the
early 1970s, the company was able to maintain an extremely rapid ex-
pansion of sales. However, price increases in commodities such as cof-
fee and sugar in 1970 were so dramatic and resulted in such large gains
for option customers that the firm was soon unable to pay. Without
actual hedged positions in the marketplace, it had no means by which
to deliver the appropriate futures contracts to its customers or other-
wise to realize the gains accruing to the supposed "option" positions.5 0
In early 1973, Goldstein-Samuelson and two other large option
firms were put into involuntary receivership by the California Corpora-
tions Commissioner, who banned further option sales." On April 30,
1973, after being investigated in a number of states, Goldstein-Samuel-
son was declared bankrupt.5 2 It has been estimated that the Goldstein-
Samuelson firm left behind as much as $85 million in unsatisfied claims
of "commodity option" purchasers. 3
From a regulatory point of view, the naked option scheme
presented serious difficulties. Since firms such as Goldstein-Samuelson
dealt in commodities not expressly enumerated by the Commodity Ex-
48. Long 85-86.
49. Wall St. J., June 28, 1973, at 38, col. 1. In 1920, Charles Bianci, alias Charles Ponzi, set
up shop near Boston's city hall. He promised investors he would double their money in 90 days
and actually did so for his initial customers. As might be expected, word of this amazing offer
spread like wildfire. People lined the street in front of Ponzi's office to turn over their money.
Ponzi took over $10 million before he was exposed. His simple scheme consisted of paying offold
customers' profits with new customers' incoming cash and relying upon exploding growth to sus-
tain the operation. Id See also Ferris, Justice Holmes and the Buckeishops, FARM Q.,Winter 1968-
1969, at 6.
50. Comment, Regulation of Commodity Related,4buses, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 137, 156 n.93
(1975).
51. In re Goldstein-Samuelson, Inc., No. 7303131 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 1973).
52. Stipulation of All Relevant Facts in Lieu of Trial on Preliminary and Permanent Injunc-
tion for the Plaintiff at 3-7, SEC v. Goldstein-Samuelson, Inc., No. 73-472 RJK (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11,
1973).
53. Long 83 n.29.
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change Act of 1936,14 there existed neither authority nor mandate to
regulate these option firms."
It should be clear that the Goldstein-Samuelson commodity option
business really had nothing whatsoever to do with commodity op-
tions.56 A customer of Goldstein-Samuelson never acquired any inter-
est either directly or indirectly in an option contract. Rather, he was in
effect buying a stake in the assets of Goldstein-Samuelson, Inc. and was
relying upon that firm's "expertise" in the option markets, or at least its
ability to continue generating "option" sales." Nonetheless, this activ-
ity became identified with commodity options and futures markets and
has tended to obfuscate an objective consideration of true commodity
options.
3. Dealer Options. The great public fascination with commod-
ity options that characterized the early 1970s brought success to yet
another type of commodity option: the Mocatta or dealer option. Un-
like the London option, such options are granted by a company that
deals in the actual commodity, usually gold or silver bullion. These
options are neither traded on an exchange nor processed by a clearing-
house.58 Rather, they are issued directly by a dealer in the physical
commodity to the option purchaser or to a broker who will market the
54. See notes 28 & 31 supra.
55. Because of the massive defaults that resulted, however, a number of state securities com-
missioners took enforcement action and eventually managed to put a number of firms out of
business. See, e.g., In re Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 71,095 (Okla. Dep't Sec. 1973). The termination of the Goldstein-Samuelson oper-
ation was triggered by an enforcement action instigated by the Oklahoma Department of Securi-
ties. In February 1973, that Department obtained a cease and desist order against the firm barring
any further sales of naked options in Oklahoma. Shortly thereafter, a number of other state secur-
ities administrators began to take action against the sale of naked options. Naked options were
deemed to be securities under the securities laws of the various states, either on the theory that
they constituted "investment contracts" or that they were "evidences of indebtedness" or "instru-
ments commonly known as securities." Long 88-102.
56. Comment, supra note 50, at 156 n.93. Indeed, the consensus appears to be that naked
options possess no economic utility whatever and should not be considered commodity options.
The only connection between a "naked" option and the commodity futures markets is the fact that
the market prices of futures are used as an index to determine which options are "in the money."
As one commentator has stated, the naked option dealers could just as easily have wagered "on
the temperature in Los Angeles or the whereabouts of Secretary Kissinger." 1974 1House Hearings
194 (statement of Dr. Henry Jarecki). The only economic effect that has been attributed to naked
option trading is that it probably drains liquidity from the legitimate futures markets by luring
away speculators. 1974 Senate Hearings 829.
57. Compare the operation of the "Ponzi" scheme, discussed at note 49 supra.
58. The information included here about Mocatta Metals Corporation is taken from the com-
pany's request for a "no-action" letter regarding the company's sale of options and from the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission's reply. The correspondence is collected at [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,940.
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contracts. These options are often issued against inventories of the
physical commodity or against futures contracts in the commodity,5 9
but there is generally no requirement that they be so backed or hedged.
The major regulatory concern over dealer options has been that
they are not necessarily limited to contracts backed by a sufficient
amount of the physical commodity to insure performance of the option
commitments. Thus, similar to London and to naked options, a pur-
chaser of dealer options undertakes two separate types of risk: the risk
of price fluctuation in the underlying commodity and the risk that the
grantor will be unable to perform its obligations.6" The latter type of
risk has prompted the Georgia Securities Commissioner to take the po-
sition that the sale of a futures contract or option wherein the seller of
the contract does not possess the necessary physical commodity to ful-
fill his obligations constitutes an investment contract under Georgia se-
curities law.6
The view of the Georgia Commissioner is based upon the notion
that securities law registration provisions are intended to provide infor-
mation to the investor sufficient to help him analyze the degree of risk
that he is undertaking in dealing with a particular issuer. With dealer
options, to the extent that such options are not backed by the physical
commodity, there is an "enterprise risk"-the financial stability of the
granting firm-separate from the risk presented by price fluctuations
for the underlying commodity.6" While dealing in Mocatta options was
not fraught with the abuses that were the apparent concomitants of
London and naked options, this risk to consumers alone was sufficient
to bring Mocatta dealings into the limelight when Congress in 1973
finally began to review the state of affairs in the option and futures
markets.
D. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.
In certain respects, regulation of the London, naked and Mocatta
options sold in the United States in the 1970s suffered from deficiencies
similar to those present in efforts to regulate the troublesome privileges
of the nineteenth century. 3 The sales occurred off the exchanges, with-
59. See the description of dealer options presented by Mocatta Metals Corp. to the SEC in
which they explained that in their operation Mocatta would either own the necessary silver bul-
lion to meet its option commitments or, in the alternative, would have the capacity to acquire a
sufficient quantity to do so. Mocatta Metals Corp., No-Action Letter (July 1, 1974), reprinted in
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,940, at 84,425.
60. Long 109-10.
61. Georgia Sec. Comm'r Rel. No. 1, IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 114,612 (Sept. 18, 1973).
62. Id.
63. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
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out the protection of any clearinghouse guaranties or deposits. Since
they were virtually unregulated, these transactions were easily subject
to fraud and abuse and provided extreme risks for the con-
sumer/investors involved. Due to their apparent lucrativeness and
their unregulated nature, sales in these types of options burgeoned. 4
Paralleling this tremendous growth in option and futures trading
were several agricultural developments that wreaked havoc on world
food prices. 5 A reduction of government reserves of feed grain pursu-
ant to a policy of freer agricultural markets, the mysterious disappear-
ance of anchovies off the coast of Peru (anchovies being a major source
of protein) and a sharp reduction in supplies of peanut meal (the
world's third major source of feed) due to a terrible drought in India
and parts of Africa66 combined to produce spiraling food prices. This
phenomenon renewed the century-old suspicion that backroom specu-
lators were once again manipulating prices.67
These parallel-and related--developments of exponentially ex-
panding trading and disastrous agricultural developments coincided to
produce strong pressure on Congress to reexamine the commodity fu-
tures markets.68 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
197469 was the result.
For instance, because it was considered akin to gambling, trading in privileges was not per-
mitted in the pits of the Chicago Board of Trade futures exchange and was denied the enforce-
ment and protective mechanisms of the Exchange, see note 7 supra, but was not banned outright.
Consequently, trading in privileges remained "a widely accepted business practice," Lurie 32, over
which no effective regulation could be asserted. The volume of trade increased erratically in the
1870s, leading to an increase in natural price fluctuation. This encouraged speculators to "run
comers." Id. 39. To the extent that privileges were used to corner the market, the Board abdi-
cated its ability to control the abuse by moving option trading from the floor to the backroom.
The lack of regulation led, in part, to the abuses.
64. H.R. RP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974). This increase in option sales parallels
an explosive growth in commodity trading generally. Between 1969 and 1973, the volume of
trading on the regulated commodity exchanges nearly doubled from 9.3 to 18.2 million contracts.
During the same period, futures in unregulated commodities--such as cocoa, coffee, sugar, pre-
cious metals, wood products and foreign currency-quadrupled from 1.8 million to 7.5 million
contracts. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
65. Small Business Problems Involvedin the Marketing of Grain and other Commodities." Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the House Permanent Select
Comm on Small Business, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1973) (testimony of Frederick Uhlmann).
The economic developments included what the Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade has
referred to as an "extraordinary coincidence of global events which suddenly wiped out the last of
our dwindling grain surpluses and plunged the world into severe shortages of food." Id.
66. Greenstone, The CFTC and Government Reorganization: Preserving Regulatory
Independence, 33 Bus. LAw. 163, 164, 180 (1977).
67. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
68. See 120 CONG. REc. 10738-39 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Mayne).
69. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
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The 1974 Act constituted a substantial revision of the 1936 Act.70
In it Congress extended the coverage of the Commodity Exchange Act
to include not only previously unregulated commodities, but also all
other goods, articles, and all services, rights and interests in which fu-
tures contracts might be traded.71 In addition, the 1974 Act created the
CFTC, giving it the status of an independent agency to administer the
Commodity Exchange Act." The Commission was granted exclusive
jurisdiction over transactions involving futures contracts and certain
other commodity-related activities, including option trading.7"
With respect to commodity options, the CFTC Act continued the
prohibition on option transactions involving the agricultural commodi-
ties enumerated prior to 1974. However, Congress gave the Commis-
sion the power to extend this prohibition to options on any other
commodities covered under the new Act or to permit options on previ-
ously nonenumerated commodities to be traded subject to whatever
terms and conditions the Commission might prescribe. 74 Thus, for the
first time, commodity options became subject to regulation by a federal
agency.7
5
II. CFTC ACTIVITY SINCE 1974
In 1974 Congress clearly expected that the newly created in-
dependent Commission would be capable of regulating those firms en-
gaged in selling commodity options so that episodes like the Goldstein-
Samuelson affair would not recur.76 Initially, the CFTC was given one
year in which to promulgate rules and regulations to govern option
70. For a detailed discussion of the major provisions of the CFTC Act, see Purcell & Valdez,
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974. Regulatory Legislation for Commodity
Futures Trading in a Market-Oriented Economy, 21 S. DAKOTA L. REV. 555, 565-90 (1976).
71. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
72. Id. § 4a(a).
73. Id. § 2. This section provides in pertinent part:
That the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agree-
ments (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is commonly known to
the trade as, an "option", "privilege", "indemnity", "bid", "offer", "put", "call", "ad-
vance guaranty", or "decline guaranty"), and transactions involving contracts of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market designated pur-
suant to ... this title or any other board of trade, exchange, or market ....
74. Id. § 6c.
75. Specifically, section 6c(b) of the CFTC Act provides:
No person shall offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the execution of, any transac-
tion ... involving any commodity ... not specifically set forth in section 2 of this title
S.. which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an 'option' ...
contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the Commission prohibiting any such trans-
action or allowing any such transaction under such terms and conditions as the Commis-
sion shall prescribe. ...
76. In the 1974 legislation, Congress demonstrated its faith in the CFTC by giving it virtually
complete authority over option trading on the previously unregulated commodities-allowing the
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trading.77 However, this period was extended at the request of the
Commission to allow the formulation of a comprehensive set of rules to
govern this activity.78 Because the project proved too ambitious, the
Commission chose to adopt interim rules to govern off-exchange com-
modity option trading before undertaking the more difficult task of
fashioning regulations for trading on the domestic exchanges.79
The interim or "Part A" regulations, adopted November 24, 1976,
set forth a number of requirements for firms and individuals involved
in option trading. As of January 17, 1977, firms offering options to the
public were required to register with the Commission as futures com-
mission merchants (FCMs). Similarly, individuals engaged in solicit-
ing orders from customers were required to register as "associated
persons."8' 0 As FCMs, the firms became subject to minimum financial
requirements set forth in the Commission's regulations.81 In addition,
a number of customer protection rules were set forth, including the re-
quired segregation of customer funds, disclosures of risk to customers
and recordkeeping.82
By mid-summer 1977, the Commission had licensed sixty Ameri-
can firms to conduct business in London options under the interim reg-
ulations.8 3 However, the task of eliminating abuses in the sale of such
options proved more burdensome than had been anticipated. Indeed,
rather than diminishing under Commission regulation, the problems
and abuses that had plagued commodity options in the early 1970s in-
creased drastically. 4 Perhaps encouraged by the official recognition of
London option trading, many new firms, employing rather question-
able practices, entered the business during 1976 and 1977. Throughout
the months of December 1977 and January 1978, American newspapers
were filled with stories of commodity option fraud perpetrated by firms
like Lloyd Carr & Co.8 5
CFTC either to ban such trading altogether or to regulate it in any manner the CFTC might
choose. See 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 628-31.
77. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (1976).
78. See 41 Fed. Reg. 16,685 (1976).
79. Id. 51,808-17. See also 1978 House Hearings 37-38 (statement of William Bagley).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1977).
81. Id. § 1.17.
82. Id. §§ 32.5-.9.
83. CFTC News Release #316-77, July 27, 1977, at 3.
84. 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 28.
85. See, eg., Carr Suspect Believedto Shift Funds, Washington Post, Jan. 30, 1978, § D, at 7,
coL 1; Four FirmsAccused of Trading Violations with London Options, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1978, at
21, col 1; Kramer, Options Man Caught in $130-a-Day Fla. Suite, Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1978,
§ D, at 9, col. 1; Three OffcialsAreArrestedin Commodities Options Case, Washington Post, Jan.
11, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 1; Lynch, Lloyd Carr Case Seen Testing CFTC/As Firm Grows Despite
LegalHassles, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1977, at 22, col. 4.
Goldstein-Samuelson's mass-marketing success was repeated five years later by Lloyd Carr &
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While accurate figures are not available, this recent wave of activ-
ity in the commodity option area has involved several hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars invested by unsophisticated investors through several
dozen firms.86 Despite the extensive authority and powers given to the
CFTC in 1974 to deal with deceptive sales practices and fraudulent
transactions attributed to firms like Lloyd Carr, commodity option
sales presented a regulatory problem of major proportions for the
CFTC.87 Although the Commission managed to obtain injunctions
against fifty-five commodity option firms and individuals and takes
credit for putting fourteen companies out of business,8 8 it approached
1978 congressional oversight hearings89 with a dismal record for pro-
tecting the public. Quite simply, the commodity option industry had
grown to a size that the fledgling Commission could not control.
Co., Ltd. Lloyd Carr was formed with an initial capitalization of $2,000 in mid-1976. In the space
of 18 months, it had mushroomed into a major enterprise with 12 commodity option sales offices
across the country operated by over 700 employees. Lynch, supra. By the time an injunction was
issued against the firm in Michigan in December 1977, Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346 (W.D.
Mich. 1977), sales had ballooned to an estimated annual rate of more than $50 million. Lynch,
supra. For the administrative proceedings before the CFTC involving Lloyd Carr, see In re Carr,
CFTC Docket No. 77-6, COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,454 (1977), remanded with directions,
Lloyd Carr & Co. v. CFTC, 567 F.2d 1193 (2d Cir. 1977).
The Lloyd Carr situation was, in fact, the most notorious failure of the Commission in con-
trolling commodity option fraud. The Commission began on February 8, 1977 to seek injunctive
relief in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts since the firm had not
registered to sell commodity options under the interim regulations. The District Court Judge
twice denied the Commission's motion for a temporary restraining order and refused to rule on
the Commission's motion for a preliminary injunction. This decision was appealed to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals and resulted in a remand to the District Court for further appropriate
action. Kelley v. Can, COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,510 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
On November 3, 1977, the Commission filed a motion in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan seeking similar relief against the Lloyd Can firm. On Novem-
ber 14, Chief Judge Fox entered a temporary restraining order against the firm and the individual
defendants enjoining them from further violations of the Commission's anti-fraud regulations and
other provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id.; Kelley v. Can, 442 F. Supp. 346, 348, 359
(W.D. Mich. 1977). On January 9, 1978, Judge Fox also issued a writ of arrest pursuant to which
James Carr and others were arrested by the U.S. Marshals in Boston. Kelley v. Can, COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 20,510 (W.D. Mich. 1977). In the course of the investigation conducted thereaf-
ter by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it was discovered that James Car was in reality Alan
Abrahams, an escaped convict from New Jersey. Carr Suspect Believed to Shift Funds, supra.
86. Then CFTC Vice-Chairman John V. Rainbolt II estimated in January 1978 that the vol-
ume of London option sales amounted to at least $200 to $300 million annually, or about two
percent of the $1 trillion-plus total volume in futures trading in the United States in 1977. Wash-
ington Post, Jan. 7, 1978, § C, at 8, col. 5.
87. By the end of fiscal year 1977, the Commission estimated that 20% of its total staff was
involved in regulating commodity option sales. In fiscal year 1977 alone, the CFTC spent $1.5
million and 50 staff-years attempting to control the problems connected with commodity options.
1978 House 4ppropriation Hearings 29.
88. Id.
89. Section 101(b) of the CFTC Act of 1974,7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1976), had authorized appro-
priations of funds to carry out the provisions of the Act for four fiscal years ending June 30, 1978.
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At the Commission meeting held on January 25, 1978, Chairman
Bagley announced publicly that the CFTC had been unable to regulate
the sale of London options to the public.90 The Commission attributed
its failure to control firms such as Lloyd Carr in part to the absence of a
body of appellate law interpreting the 1974 Act, which would have ex-
pedited the securing of injunctive relief.9' Moreover, the Commission
claimed it lacked sufficient financial resources to police the options area
effectively.92 For these reasons, the Commission voted to publish a
proposal for the suspension of all London and dealer option transac-
tions.93 Notice of the proposed suspension was published in the Federal
Register on February 6, 1978,94 and after public hearings, a notice of
suspension was published on April 17, 1978.95 The suspension, with
only limited exemptions for trade options96 and a limited class of
dealer options, became effective on June 1, 1978.
9 7
With the Commission's suspension action as a backdrop, both the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry and the
House Committee on Agriculture, in connection with their respective
reauthorization hearings, began to review the performance of the
CFTC.98 Due to the widely publicized scandals in commodity option
sales, each committee spent a great deal of time examining the com-
modity option industry. In response to these scandals, a bill was intro-
duced in the House that would have imposed a permanent ban on all
commodity option trading.99 The Senate's response, S. 2391, also pro-
scribed all commodity option trading, but, unlike the House version,
the proposed Senate ban was to remain in effect until further action of
90. CFTC Proposes London Options Sales Suspension, Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1978, § D,
at 11, col. I.
91. 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 143. See note 76 supra.
92. 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 34-35.
93. Id. 452.
94. 43 Fed. Reg. 4,869 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. Part 32).
95. 43 Fed Reg. 16,153 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.11).
96. Trade options are used by commercial interests in their dealings with similar commercial
interests and do not involve consumers. 43 Fed. Reg. 16, 153 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §
32.11).
97. Id. There do exist, however, provisions for lifting the suspension. In determining when
and whether the suspension will be lifted, the Commission will consider (1) the prospects for
effective self-regulation, (2) the success of a pilot program for domestically exchange-traded op-
tions, (3) whether customers can be protected if foreign options are included in the pilot program
and.(4) the strengthening of the CFTC's enforcement capability. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,160 (1978).
98. See S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978); H. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10-12 (1978)
99. H.R. 10901, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H944 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1978) (intro-
duced by Rep. Smith of Iowa).
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the Commission. 00
Witnesses testifying before the Subcommittee on Conservation
and Credit of the House Committee on Agriculture were split almost
evenly on the question of whether option sales should be banned or
permitted.101 The House Committee voted to include the ban in the
final version of H.R. 10285, reporting the bill out with the following
explanation:
The Committee recognizes the magnitude of the abuses which have
been perpetrated on the public in the offer and sale of commodity
options and believes that the Commission should have a period of
time in which to evaluate fully the terms and conditions under which
commodity options might be offered, if at all, consistent with ade-
quate customer protection. Accordingly, H.R. 10285 imposes a Con-
gressional ban on all commodity option transactions involving those
commodities not set forth in section 2(a)(1) of the Act unless such
transactions are expressly permitted under rules and regulations
adopted by the Commission subsequent to the date of enactment of
the bill.10
The House bill effectively affirmed the action taken by the Commission
in banning commodity option sales and gave the Commission the au-
thority to formulate a new program to regulate such trading, subject to
a congressional veto.10 3 The Senate Committee, on the other hand, ap-
proved a ban on commodity option trading, but did not give the Com-
mission authority to grant exemptions from that ban except via a
program for domestic exchange trading.l°4
The conference committee adopted a compromise version of the
ban on option trading that carried forward the ban on all offers and
sales of commodity options, with the exception of trade options and
certain dealer options. 10 5 The Commission would be allowed, how-
100. S. 2391, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S28 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978) (introduced
by Sen. Huddleston).
101. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978).
102. Id. 17.
103. H.R. 10285, as passed by the House on July 26, 1978, provided in section 2 that any
subsequent rule or regulation allowing option trading could not become effective until 10 days
after it was submitted to the House and Senate Agriculture Committees and neither House of
Congress passed a resolution disapproving the rule within that time. Id. 26.
104. S. 2391, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1978) (as adopted by the Senate on July 12, 1978).
105. S. REP. No. 1239, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978). Exempted from the ban are "trade"
options. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, sec. 3(3), § 4c(c), 92 Stat. 865 (to be
codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c)). The Act exempts a narrow class of dealers granting options to the
general public:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (c) of this section-
(1) any person domiciled in the United States who on May 1, 1978, was in the
business of granting an option on a physical commodity and was in the business of buy-
ing, selling, producing, or otherwise using that commodity, may continue to grant or
issue options on that commodity in accordance with Commission regulations in effect on
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ever, to come forward with a new plan of regulation and evidence of its
ability to regulate options effectively, in which case the ban would be
lifted.106 The bill, now known as the Futures Trading Act of 1978, be-
came law on September 30, 197.1 07
Regardless of the contours of the commodity option program, it is
abundantly clear that neither the CFTC nor Congress will accede to
permanent trading unless it can be shown that such trading will further
some economic purpose or will benefit the public. 08 While some
would disagree, 10 9 this author feels that there are substantial economic
benefits to be realized in a properly regulated option market. Any as-
sessment of the outcome of the test of regulated trading embodied in
the pilot program requires a proper understanding of the potential ben-
efits of option trading.
August 17, 1978, until thirty days after the effective date of regulations issued by the
Commission under section (2) of this subsection...
(2) the Commission shall issue regulations that permit grantors and futures com-
mission merchants to offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the execution of, any
commodity option transaction on a physical commodity subject to the provisions of sub-
section (b) of this section if-
(A) the grantor is a person domiciled in the United States who-
(i) is in the business of buying, selling, producing, or otherwise using the un-
derlying commodity;
(ii) at all times has a net worth of at least $5,000,000 certified annually by an
independent public accountant using generally accepted accounting principles;
(iii) notifies the Commission and every futures commission merchant offering
the grantor's option if the grantor knows or has reason to believe that the grantor's net
worth has fallen below $5,000,000;
(iv) segregates daily, exclusively for the benefit of purchasers, money, ex-
empted securities, . . . commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, commercial bills, or
unencumbered warehouse receipts, equal to an amount by which the value of each trans-
action exceeds the amount received by the grantor for such transaction;
(v) provides an identification number for each transaction; and
(vi) provides confirmation of all orders for such transactions executed, includ-
ing the execution price and a transaction identification number ....
Pub. L. No. 95-405, sec. 3(3), § 4c(d), 92 Stat. 865 (to be codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(d)).
106. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, sec. 3(3), § 4c(c), 92 Stat. 865 (to be
codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c)).
107. Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865.
108. As Chairman Bagley has noted, "[i]n determining whether to continue option trading
. . . the Commission.. . will have to conclude that the option markets are used on more than an
occasional basis for other than speculative purposes by producers, processors, merchants or con-
sumers. ... 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 215 (testimony of William Bagley). See also
43 Fed. Reg. 16,153, 16,155 (1978). This is essentially the same test which the Commission has
applied in designating a contract market for a new futures contract. CFTC Public Interest Guide-
line No. 1, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) S 20,041 (1975).
The economic purpose test posed by the Commission for futures and options contracts does
not have a specific legislative basis. Rather, the pertinent provisions of the Commodity Exchange
Act contain a broader standard, namely, that such trading not be "contrary to the public interest."
See CFTC Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. § 7(g) (1976); cf Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
405, sec. 3(3), § 4c(e), 92 Stat. 865 (to be codified in 7 U.S.C. § 6c(e)) (Congress imposes a public
interest test for dealer options).
109. See, e.g., Note, The Role ofthe Commodity Futures Trading Commission Under the Corn.
modity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 73 MICH. L. REv. 710, 723-25 (1975).
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III. AN EVALUATION OF COMMODITY OPTION TRADING
Although there has been more than a century of discussion and
debate, no coherent explanation of the general economic effects of op-
tion trading and of the function of options in connection with futures
markets has emerged. With the exception of a Department of Agricul-
ture study published in 1934,11o which made use of very limited data, I'I
there has been no thorough study of the functions and effects of
commodity options since privilege trading began in the 1860s.1 2
However, important theoretical benefits and uses do exist, and the real-
ization of those benefits will justify permanent commodity option trad-
ing in a properly regulated forum.
A. The Economic Benefts of Option Trading.
In attempting to ascertain the benefits of option trading, the ana-
lytical focus should center on two principal types of option con-
tracts-exchange-traded options on physical inventories or on futures
contracts, and dealer or Mocatta options.! 3
1. Options as a Means of Risk Tranyer. Commodity options,
like futures contracts, owe their existence to the presence of economic
risk. An option, in fact, performs the same function as a futures con-
tract by transferring the risk of in adverse price movement in a particu-
lar commodity from one party who wishes to avoid that risk to another
party who is more willing or able to assume it. For example, the holder
of an unhedged futures position bears a substantial risk that the market
price for the underlying commodity will move adversely to his position
by the time the delivery month arrives. By granting an option against
the futures position, however, that party can pass on to someone else
110. MEHL.
111. Id. 9.
112. This is due in part to the nineteenth century backroom trading that took place at the
Chicago Board of Trade. Since all transactions were settled in cash, and no records of the number
and size of the trades were maintained by the Exchange, very little empirical data exists for this
period. For a brief time after indemnity trading resumed in 1926, however, exchanges of funds
were recorded and handled through the Clearing Association of the Chicago Board of Trade. Id.
The only volume records that the Department of Agriculture had available in 1934 were main-
tained by the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the U.S. Treasury Department, which collected a
stamp tax on sales of offers (ie., put options).
113. Dealer/Mocatta options are discussed in the text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
There also exists a third type of contract-the so-called naked option. See text accompanying
notes 43-57 supra. The consensus appears to be that naked options possess no economic utility
whatsoever and should not be considered commodity options. See note 56 supra. They will not be
considered here for this reason.
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the risk of an adverse price move.' 14 The holder of physical inventory,
on the other hand, bears the risk that the market value for his inventory
will decline while it is in his possession. In order to pass on this risk,
the inventory holder might grant a call option to an interested investor,
thus offsetting the price decline by the amount of the premium re-
ceived. The inventory holder could also purchase a put option which
would give him the right to sell his inventory to his option grantor at a
favorable price.
The mere function of transferring the risk of changed market val-
ues from one person who is illiquid or otherwise unwilling to bear that
risk to another who is highly liquid and willing to bear it actually en-
tails a reduction in overall market risk."I5 This function is, in fact, very
similar to that provided by insurance companies for automobile opera-
tors or homeowners. For the price of a premium, the insurance policy
holder obtains protection against catastrophic loss while the insurance
company offsets its potential obligations by the premiums received. 16
In the commodity markets, the economic benefit of such risk transfers
can generally be translated into lower consumer prices for food and
other manufactured items." 7 The importance of this effect of option
trading on consumer prices has been strongly emphasized by the Presi-
dent's Council on Wage and Price Stability:
Frequently, those engaged in the production and sale of goods
are not best equipped to bear risk. The risk which they do bear is
directly translatable into production costs which are passed on to
consumers in the prices they pay. The existence of a mechanism,
such as the option, for transferring or reducing risk is directly trans-
latable into lower consumer costs.'
1 8
2. Increasing the Flow of Funds into the Commodity Indus-
try. Another major advantage of commodity option trading on do-
mestic exchanges is the resulting stimulation of the flow of private in-
vestment capital into the commodity markets generally." 9 In the same
way that the securities markets facilitate the flow of capital from those
who hold it to those who can put it to the most effective economic use,
the public sale of commodity options can attract capital to the com-
114. 1974 House Hearings 197; Baumol 5-9.
115. 1974 House Hearings 197; Baumol 7.
116. 1974 House Hearings 197; see Baumol 8.
117. 1974 House Hearings 199; Baumol 17.
118. Comments of the Council on Wage and Price Stability on Commodity Options Transac-
tions-Proposed Amendment of Interim Regulations 6 (June 6, 1977); accord, 1974 House
Hearings 199; Baumol 17.
119. 1974 House Hearings 199; see 1978 House Hearings 116 (letter from Rep. Dan Glick-
man).
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modity futures markets to assist market participants in their productive
activities.
For example, through the use of commodity options a manufac-
turer can effectively increase the real capital resources under his con-
trol. Since a manufacturer can keep a considerable inventory at his
command with the relatively small expense involved in purchasing an
option, the amount of the manufacturer's own capital tied up in his
inventory can be greatly reduced. 20 The availability of commodity op-
tion trading can provide substantial flexibility to a manufacturer or
producer by transferring to investors the cost of carrying inventories.
Also, instead of holding a simple inventory of raw materials that may
be subject to the risk of price volatility, a manufacturer can transform
that inventory into a rich variety of investment possibilities, each of
which might be attractive to a different group of investors. 12' By this
process, options can provide a flow of funds that will allow producers
and manufacturers to function more efficiently.
3. Limitation of Risk Caused by Price Volatility Options Versus
Futures. Probably the single greatest advantage of options over fu-
tures trading is that the option holder's risk is always limited to the
premium paid. An option holder undertakes no obligation to post mar-
gins,12 2 whereas the purchaser of a futures contract would be required
to post an initial margin deposit and might later be called upon to post
substantial "maintenance margins" in the event of adverse price
moves. 1
2 3
Although an option holder undertakes no margin responsibilities,
he nonetheless obtains an opportunity to observe market price varia-
tions for a period of time from a position that is superior to that of the
futures contract holder. For example, a period of excessive adverse
price movement might force a futures contract holder out of the market
if he were unable to post the required maintenance margins. The op-
tion holder, on the other hand, can "ride out" such a period of adverse
price movement until the expiration date of the contract, at which time
the price may have returned to a more favorable level.124 Thus, the
option holder has an unfettered opportunity to observe periods of high
market volatility with no risk of substantial demands on his cash
120. Baumol 17.
121. Id. 18.
122. This is because the option holder has no affirmative responsibility to perform and may
abandon the contract without further obligation once his premium has been paid.
123. Note, supra note 44, at 1425. See note 3 supra.
124. M. POWERS, supra note 13, at 198. See also 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 214




4. Increased Stability of Futures Prices. A number of experts
maintain that option trading has a stabilizing effect on futures prices. 26
These experts argue that persons holding options for speculative pur-
poses will normally seek to sell when the price of an underlying com-
modity or futures contract is high and will seek to buy when its price is
low. Thus, the speculator is inclined to contribute to the supply of a
commodity through his sales when increased demand pushes prices
high. This increased supply in turn reduces the upward price push. In
the converse situation, a speculator is likely to buy the underlying com-
modity or futures contract when the price is low, thus adding to the
demand and providing an upward impetus for prices. This theoretical
assertion has been compared to the experience in the securities markets
where the issuance of warrants for convertible bonds (essentially the
same as options) has been observed to cause a substantial reduction in
price fluctuations for the underlying securities.'27 In fact, the 1934 De-
partment of Agriculture study found that a stabilizing influence seemed
to result from privilege trading because speculators tended to trade
against price movements, thereby moderating those price movements to
a certain extent. 128 Such a result is indeed beneficial.
In summary, then, options can play an important and beneficial
economic role, particularly with respect to limiting risks and stabilizing
prices. However, in addition to this economic role, commodity options
may be useful aids to trading in the futures market.
125. M. PowERs, supra note 13, at 198. See also 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 215
(statement of William Bagley). The risk of an option grantor, on the other hand, is not necessarily
so limited. If he is not the owner of physical inventories or the holder of futures contracts suffi-
cient to meet his obligations under the option, the option grantor bears the risk that the price at
which he must buy the underlying futures contract or physical inventory to "deliver" under a call
option (or the price at which he can dispose of a contract or inventory "put" to him by his op-
tionee) will have moved adversely to the striking price stated in the option. The grantor thus has a
risk of exposure to adverse price movements identical to that of the holder of a comparable futures
position--except that he has the benefit of an offsetting premium.
There are various ways in which option grantors can protect themselves from otherwise unac-
ceptable risks. As indicated above, the risk is eliminated if the grantor owns a sufficient amount of
the underlying commodity or futures contract to meet his obligations under the option. Such a
"one for one" matching of inventory and futures with option obligations might, however, prove
unduly burdensome to a commercial grantor. Probably the best protection would be provided by
a system whereby option grantors were subject to regulation by an exchange and its clearinghouse.
This would involve the constant monitoring of market prices to determine which options are "in
the money" and the posting of adequate margins to insure the grantors' ability to perform under
those options.
126. Eg., Baumol 20; Note, supra note 44, at 1443-44.
127. 1974 House Hearings 200 (statement of Dr. Henry Jarecki).
128. MEHL 70-72; see Note, supra note 109, at 725.
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B. Options as an Aid to Futures Trading.
Beyond the benefits accruing to the public and to the commodity
industry through the use of commodity options, options used in con-
junction with futures trading can provide a number of new possibilities
for traders. For example, traders often employ options as "stop orders"
on futures contracts.1 29 Futures traders frequently attempt to limit
their losses by placing a stop order with their brokers instructing them
to close out the futures position if the price reaches a certain level.
However, this system does not always operate effectively since, in vola-
tile trading, the market price may pass through a stop order price level
before the order can be exercised. An option, on the other hand, can
give the trader full assurance that he will be able to dispose of his fu-
tures position at the chosen price. 130 Moreover, the option holder can
wait out an adverse price move without closing out his futures position.
Thus, for the price of a premium, futures traders can obtain precise
limitations on their losses-a better result than that presently available
through the use of stop orders.
In addition, options can be useful to the holder of a futures posi-
tion in liquidating that position during a period of rapid price change.
Since the futures exchanges impose daily price limits on the extent to
which futures prices may rise above or fall below the previous day's
settlement figure,13 ' it may not be possible to liquidate a futures posi-
tion on such a day. However, if the holder has an offsetting option
position-which would not be subject to the trading limit-it would be
possible to liquidate the option position by placing a market order in
the option market to buy or sell the futures contract at the striking
price.1 32
Thus, there are apparently a number of ways in which option trad-
ing can create economic benefits. However, the Commission has
proved unwilling to allow the resumption of option trading solely on
the basis of bald assertions of their economic utility. Instead, the Com-
mission has proposed a pilot program that will allow limited option
trading for a test period. The data assimilated under this pilot program
should enable the Commission to determine whether these theoretical
economic benefits materialize in actual trading. This determination, in
turn, will seal the fate of option trading in the United States. Due to
129. M. POWERS, supra note 13, at 199.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade, Rules and Regulations, Reg. 1823 (1976).
132. The holder can thus obtain the right to purchase a futures contract at a price that would
not have been permitted in that day's futures trading. For a discussion of this point, see 1978
Senate Hearings 153 (statement of Dr. Hendrik Houthakker).
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the gravity of the decision facing the Commission, two questions must
be considered: first, is the pilot program structured to generate the em-
pirical data necessary to ascertain the existence of economic benefits
arising from option trading and, second, do adequate standards exist to
evaluate such data once it has been obtained?
IV. THE PROPOSED PILOT PROGRAM
In addition to the interim or Part A regulations outlined above,
133
the Commission contemplated a second phase or Part B series of regu-
lations that would provide for a three-year pilot program under which
the Commission can gather sufficient empirical evidence to determine
whether option trading should be allowed on domestic commodity ex-
changes and, if so, on what basis. 34 According to the Commission,
only the existence of economic benefits will justify a continuation of
this activity. The goal, as the Commission sees it, is to "make a judg-
ment whether or not option trading involving the newly-regulated com-
modities is contrary to the public interest."
'131
The Part B regulations proposed by the Commission would restrict
commodity option transactions to those executed on or subject to the
rules of a domestic or foreign commodity option exchange, provided
that certain additional requirements concerning foreign options are
met. 136 This provision would effectively outlaw the offer and sale of
"naked" options and other options not traded on an exchange. 137 With
respect to customer protection, the Part B regulations for the most part
carry forward the provisions of the Commission's interim regulations
concerning the registration of option firms as FCMs, the segregation of
customer funds, the mandatory disclosure of risk to customers and the
maintenance of proper books and records.1
38
Basically, the system proposed for regulating domestic option trad-
133. See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
134. 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 491, 631 (Report on the CFTC prepared by the
Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Comm. on Appropriations).
135. 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 462.
136. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,550 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.3(a)).
137. However, off-exchange trading of trade options between commercial entities would be
permitted under section 32.2(a). See note 96 supra. The proposed regulations have not yet dealt
with the issue of dealer options. Nonetheless, in the explanatory text accompanying the proposed
regulations, the Commission indicated that it is willing to permit the trading of dealer options if it
can be convinced that appropriate safeguards can be provided to account for the absenc of a
clearing mechanism. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,538, 55,540 (1977). Since the Commission has subsequently
adopted a specific exemption for dealer options under its June 1, 1978 ban, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,704
(1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.12), it appears likely that dealer options will be included in
the pilot program.
138. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,553 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.6(d), (e) and (f)).
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ing parallels that which applies to trading in futures contracts. The
Commission would regulate the exchanges by designating them as "do-
mestic commodity option exchanges" and would have the authority to
review and approve the rules, by-laws and resolutions of each ex-
change.139 Most of the mechanical details of trading option contracts,
such as the margin requirements, clearing procedures and the delivery
process, would be left up to the exchanges themselves. 140 Finally, the
Commission proposes to limit the speculative leverage of option traders
to some extent by prohibiting the margining of option premiums.14'
Within the framework of its Part B regulations, the Commission
has indicated its intent to license each exchange to trade options for no
more than one commodity, and to issue no more than one license to
trade options for each commodity. A further limitation will likely be
that an exchange will be eligible for designation for a particular option
only if it is also designated as a contract market for the underlying
futures contract. 42
The original version of the Part B regulations, published on April
5, 1977, would have limited option trading on domestic exchanges to
call options. In response to strong comments from the industry that
there may well be more economic justification for put rather than call
option trading on certain commodities, this provision has been broad-
ened to allow both put and call options under the pilot program. 43
However, the Commission has stated that it does not intend at the out-
set to license the same exchange for trading in both put and call options
on the same commodity. 44
One of the major shortcomings of the pilot program is the narrow
limits that it will place on option activity. While limiting each ex-
change to a single option contract and not allowing an exchange to
offer both puts and calls on a commodity may be desirable in terms of
139. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,544, 55,553, 55,555 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §§ 32.6(a) and
32.13).
140. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,542 (1977). The proposed regulations would, however, impose certain
specific requirements on the manner in which options could be traded. For example, the ex-
changes would be required to make available for dissemination by FCMs to their option custom-
ers a standardized disclosure statement and to give notice to an option grantor upon exercise of
each option on a futures contract. Certain delivery requirements would also be imposed with
respect to options on physical commodities.
141. See CFTC Staff Memorandum, Margining of Option Premiums (Feb. 10, 1978); 42 Fed.
Reg. 55,551 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.5(a)(l)(ii)).
142. See CFTC StaffMemorandum, Issues Raised by Part B of the Commodity Option Regu-
lations 2-3 (Jan. 18, 1978). See also 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 215 (testimony of William
Bagley).




the Commission's workload, those restrictions may seriously impair the
program's effectiveness as a means of developing valid data about the
economic utility of options and the impact of options on futures trad-
ing. The Senate Agriculture Committee, in fact, has objected to these
limitations:
The committee is concerned with the Commission's announced
plans for a "pilot program" of exchange trading of commodity op-
tions in which a limited number of commodities would be traded on
a limited number of exchanges. History indicates that pilot projects
of the kind envisioned by the Commission may become permanent
regardless of the results of the study. (It may also be questioned
whether exchange traded commodity options can be successfully
evaluated in such a limited program.)145
The Commission's own Advisory Committee on the Definition
and Regulation of Market Instruments has taken the position that the
marketplace should be allowed the benefits of unrestricted option trad-
ing unless it can be demonstrated that a particular form of option trad-
ing is contrary to the public interest. 4 6 Inasmuch as the Commission
has made no determination that options on a particular commodity are
inherently dangerous and there is no reason to suspect that protection
cannot be provided to customers of exchange-traded options, the Advi-
sory Committee clearly feels that the domestic option program should
not be unduly restricted. 47
Since the purpose of the pilot program is to test the utility and
effect of option trading, it seems counterproductive to impose restric-
tions that threaten the program's usefulness for that purpose. The best
arbiter of the types and number of options to be traded is the market-
place itself, and the Commission should allow the market to play its
natural role in the test program.148
145. S. RaP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1978).
146. Specifically, the Committee noted:
The Advisory Committee does not believe that any particular form of option trad-
ing should be prohibited, absent a finding that such transactions (A) are illegal or inher-
ently fraudulent or manipulative, or (B) are contrary to the public interest in that they
have a material adverse economic effect on futures markets or otherwise, or (C) do not
provide three of the basic consumer protections afforded to users of contracts markets
[te., segregation of customer funds, a mechanism guaranteeing performance of the op-
tion, and adequate supervision of trading practices].
ADVIsORY COMMITrEE REPORT 16.
147. Id. 15-16.
148. There are certain valid limitations to consider. For example, because of the problems
inherent in "delivering" futures positions that are traded on an exchange different from the ex-
change trading the option contract, options should be restricted to the exchanges trading the un-
derlying futures contract. Likewise, a proliferation of a given option contract on many different
exchanges might cause problems in liquidity. Cf. CBOE Says Options Shouldn't Be Traded On
Any More Markets, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1978, at 32, col. 2 (referring to proliferation problems in
stock options). However, the nature of the options themselves, the commodities on which options
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The pilot program has other shortcomings. In order to support a
continuation of commodity option trading after the three-year test pe-
riod, the Commission has stated that it must assure itself that commod-
ity options in general, and specific options in particular, meet three
requirements: first, they must serve an economic purpose; second, they
must be offered and sold consistent with adequate protection of option
customers; and, third, they must not have a material adverse effect on
domestic futures or cash markets. 49 Thus far, the Commission has
done little more than to state these three criteria. It has not undertaken
to define specifically what is meant by each test and has developed no
standards for measuring success or failure.150 While it is unreasonable
to expect the Commission to detail in advance the economic purposes
that option trading should serve or the specific "danger zone" with re-
spect to adverse impact on customers or the futures markets them-
selves, clarification is nonetheless essential. For example, there is a
great range of opinion concerning what constitutes economic purpose.
Some commentators, including the Advisory Committee on Market In-
struments, argue that any form of economic activity should be permit-
ted unless the public interest is so adversely affected that it should be
prohibited.' 51 On the other hand, the Commission apparently takes the
view that only substantial commercial-as opposed to specula-
tive-participation in option activity will show economic purpose. 15 2
The Commission must first define economic purpose if the pilot pro-
gram is to accumulate the information necessary to determine whether
such a purpose exists.
A. The Economic Purpose Test.
In order to determine whether domestic option trading serves an
economic purpose, it will be necessary to develop a framework for gen-
erating the requisite empirical information. As indicated above, nu-
merous economic uses or benefits that may result from the trading of
commodity options on domestic exchanges have been identified.153 Al-
though they cover a broad range, these economic justifications can rea-
sonably be placed in certain categories: first, economic benefits to the
are traded, whether there are puts and calls or both, and the rules relating to trading and margin
requirements should be left to the exchanges.
149. 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 462.
150. See text accompanying notes 209-18 infra.
151. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT 15.
152. In fact, the Commission recently stated before the House Appropriations Committee that
foreign and dealer options have been sold almost exclusively as speculative instruments and that
they therefore do not serve any useful economic purpose. 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 462.
153. See text accompanying notes 110-32 supra.
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parties engaged in option trading,15 4 second, facilitation of the price
discovery and price protection functions of the futures markets,'15 and,
finally, economic benefits to society as a whole.156 At this point, how-
ever, the Commission does not appear to recognize all of these levels of
economic use or benefit as factors for determining the success of its
pilot program. Rather, the Commission appears more concerned about
the identity of the purchaser of commodity options and his reasons for
purchasing. In the preamble to the Part B regulations published on
October 17, 1977 the Commission stated:
One of the purposes of the pilot program is to determine whether
option 'contracts traded on licened [sic] domestic commodity option
exchanges will be used by producers, processors, merchants, or con-
sumers engaged in handling or utilizing the commodity (including
the products, by-products or source commodity thereof) underlying
the contract.1
5 7
The Commission has further stated that in order to justify a continua-
tion of option trading it must "conclude that the option markets are
used on more than an occasional basis for other than speculative pur-
poses . . ." by such parties. 158
However, trying to determine that hedging by a commercial user,
for example, is a valid economic purpose and that "speculation" by a
private investor is not may prove to be a hindrance to the smooth and
efficient functioning of the option markets rather than sound regula-
tion. In the view of one of the principal theoreticians of the modem
American commodity futures markets, it is impossible to draw a valid
distinction between pure speculation and the supposedly more valid
economic function of hedging.5 9 Thomas A. Hieronymus argues that
154. Both the hedging possibilities for commercial users and the investment possibilities for
speculators would be encompassed by this category.
155. Increased market liquidity and the narrowing of price differentials fall into this category.
156. The reduction of prices for food and other consumer goods would be included here.
157. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,539 (1977).
158. 1978 House .4ppropriation Hearings 215 (testimony of William Bagley). The historical
bias against speculation thus appears to be the basis for the Commission's standard of economic
purpose. The accuracy of this assertion becomes all too clear upon perusal of the "Resolution
declaring dangerous tendency of dealings in commodity futures," 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976), which was
first included in the Grain Futures Act of 1922 and still exists with no appreciable alteration under
the CFTC Act of 1974. The resolution states:
[T]he transactions and prices of commodity on such boards of trade are susceptible to
speculation, manipulation, and control, and sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in the
prices thereof frequently occur as a result of such speculation, manipulation, or control,
which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer and the persons handling com-
modity and products and byproducts thereof in interstate commerce, and such fluctua-
tions in prices are an obstruction to and a burden upon interstate commerce in
commodity and the products and byproducts thereof and render regulation imperative
for the protection of such commerce and the national public interest therein.
159. SeegenerallyT. HIERoNYMUs, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING chs. 6,7, and 9 (1971).
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all trading is really speculation and that it is all necessary to the func-
tioning of the futures markets. 160 According to Hieronymus, "hedging"
is speculation in the relationship between cash and futures prices, while
"speculation" is speculation in price level changes in the futures mar-
ket.161
Another commentator has pointed out that, even aside from the
theoretical difficulties, the speculator/hedger distinction may be un-
warranted from a regulatory standpoint. In testimony before the
House Committee on Agriculture in 1974, the then Iowa Superinten-
dent of Securities pointed out:
The classic assumption that hedging was totally virtuous-and spec-
ulation but a necessary evil-may have hidden from notice and at-
tention the rankest sort of speculation, with possible attendant price
distortion, possibly engaged in by the large-scale hedgers, among
whom large grain companies are numbered. In a word, if any single
set of interests are in a possible position to manipulate a commodities
market, that set of interests is more likely to have been self-classified
as 'hedging'-and accepted by existing regulation as occupying that
role.' 62
This commentator went on to advocate a shift in the focus of commod-
ity regulation toward the encouragement and protection of the specula-
tor. 1
63
Finally, it might even be possible to turn the Hieronymus theory
on its head and state that all speculation is in fact "hedging" or risk
avoidance. Given that the concern over inflation has continued and
intensified during the 1970s and that other forms of investment such as
securities have proven less attractive as a means of protecting the value
of an investor's assets, it may be accurate to state that most private
160. Id.
161. As Hieronymus puts it:
It is sometimes said that hedging is the opposite of speculation. This is not so. They are
different kinds of the same thing. The thing that is usually identified as specula-
tion--that is, long or short positions in futures contracts [without an off-setting posses-
sion of the physical commodity]-is speculation in changes in price level. The thing that
we identify as hedging-that is, long cash [1e., possession of the physical commodity]
and short futures or vice versa-is speculation in price relationships. We may be able to
make this difference clearer by considering the case of a farmer with a bin full of wheat.
He is long cash wheat. He is speculating in the level of wheat prices and in the relation-
ship of the price of his specific lot of wheat to the general level of wheat prices. If he
hedges, he ceases to speculate in the level of wheat prices while continuing to speculate
in the relationship of his wheat to the general level. Thus, hedging and speculation are
not opposite; in fact they are conceptually similar. They are just different kinds of specu-
lation.
Id. 151.
162. 1974 House Hearings 183 (statement of Glenn Willett Clark). See also Note, Abuses In
the Commodity Markets: The Need For Change In The Regulatory Structure, 63 GEo. L.J. 751, 758
(1975).
163. 1974 House Hearings 183 (statement of Glenn Willett Clark).
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investors have been attracted to commodity options during this period
as a means of hedging.'64
Certainly, there are uses of options other than commercial hedging
that produce an economic benefit. It is hard to understand how re-
duced consumer prices or a lessening of price volatility in the futures
markets could not be considered an "economic purpose." The basic
question to be answered in formulating proper standards is at what
level do we ask the question? Deciding whether economic purpose ex-
ists presumably can involve an examination of three distinct levels of
economic effect: on the individual traders themselves, on the cash com-
modity and futures markets, and on the American economy as a whole.
Very likely, the nature and degree of benefits will be different at each
level. In any case, the Commission's concept of economic purpose is
too narrowly focused on the purposes for which the parties involved
may enter into an option transaction.
Another difficulty that may arise from the Commission's emphasis
on the identity of the trader and his purposes for trading is a defini-
tional one. Apart from the theoretical problems in differentiating be-
tween hedging and speculation noted above, the attempt to distinguish
between commercial and speculative trading may lead the Commission
into a definitional trap similar to the one that plagued the Illinois legis-
lature, the courts and Congress throughout the latter nineteenth cen-
tury-the Commission will be unable to define the evil to be prevented
and its efforts to regulate will therefore be ineffective. 16- Just as the
164. Economist Hendrik Houthakker of Harvard University supports this view. See 1978 Serr-
ate Hearings 155 (statement of Dr. Hendrik Houthakker).
165. Professor Houthakker has expressed the view that if the Commission's present standards
had been applied in the nineteenth century, there would never have been futures contracts in the
first place. Id. 152. The Illinois Act of 1874 banning commodity privilege trading, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 130 (1874), proved difficult to enforce because of the conceptual affinity between
legitimate futures trading and prohibited privilege trading. The test used by the courts to distin-
guish the two was whether the parties intended delivery under their contracts. See J.B. Lyon &
Co. v. Culbertson, Blair & Co., 83 IlI. 33 (1876). Unfortunately, it was already common practice
to enter into futures contracts that would be closed out by settlement or offset rather than by
delivery. Even though most of the contracts executed by exchange members involved no actual
delivery of the grain, id., the Illinois court uniformly insisted that delivery was required before a
contract could be enforced, id. at 44. The court did manage to expand the definition of "delivery"
in an attempt to legitimize the normal and harmless futures trading that occurred on the grain
exchanges. However, more than anything, the cases produced a great amount of uncertainty as to
what types of contracts were acceptable. Compare Clarke v. Foss, 5 F. Cas. 955, 960 (W.D. Wis.
1878) (No. 2,852) with Cothran v. Ellis, 125 Ill 496, 501 (1888) and Webster v. Sturges, 7 I11. App.
560, 564 (1880).
The difficulty faced by the Illinois courts during this period was that they were unable to
discover an adequate definition of the evil to be prevented so that it could be distinguished from
legitimate economic activity. There was a strong sense that trading in price differences, where no
transfer of property was ever contemplated, should be prohibited. On the other hand, futures
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Illinois legislature and Congress were unable to distinguish between
legitimate trading based upon price differences and "gambling," so the
Commission will find it impossible to define which forms of specula-
tion are harmful and which are not. For example, assuming the Com-
mission determines that not all speculation is bad and therefore is to be
eradicated, how will it decide what types of activity to restrict or pre-
vent? Are certain option transactions to be prohibited because the par-
ties enter into them only because of their respective guesses at future
price movements? Or is the so-called speculative activity in options to
be cut off when it reaches a certain percentage of market transactions?
And what would be an appropriate percentage at which to curtail such
activity? Clearly, the Commission needs to develop a standard that
does not focus upon the motivation of the players.
B. Customer Protection.
The second major requirement that the Commission has estab-
lished under the Part B pilot program is that the system must provide
adequate protection to the investing public. The criticism generated by
the Commission's failure to protect the public from firms such as Lloyd
Carrt 166 guarantees that the Commission will be most insistent about
this requirement and will conduct an intensive scrutiny of any cus-
tomer complaints that may arise under the pilot program.
At this stage in its development, the Commission probably knows
more about protecting customers from fraud and sharp practices than it
does about any other aspect of option regulation. However, the Com-
mission's experience up to this point has been primarily with foreign or
London options. Because domestic options and dealer options present
substantial new complexities and concerns, a proper analysis of the
proposed regulatory system should include a review of each option type
in turn.
1. Domestic Options. The introduction of commodity option
trading on the domestic exchanges will bring with it certain basic pro-
tections that will avoid many of the problems that have accompanied
off-exchange trading in the past. Exchange-traded options will involve
the competitive bidding of premiums at public outcry. This should
trading on the Board of Trade was recognized to have great economic utility even though it often
involved settlement based on price differences. See Porter v. Viets, 19 F. Cas. 1077 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1857) (No. 11,291). The gradual development of a test based upon the parties' "intent" to deliver
was the best the courts could do to resolve the dilemma.
166. See note 85 and text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
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produce generally lower investment costs to option customers. 167 But
perhaps most importantly, the domestic exchanges will provide
clearinghouse protection for each option contract.16 8 Presumably, this
clearing function will operate in virtually the same manner as that cur-
rently provided for futures contracts. The two parties to an option
trade would each submit a confirmation to the clearinghouse; the con-
firmation would be matched in terms of the basic contract
terms-including the premium, striking price and option term-and all
matched trades would then be posted to the accounts of the clearing
members through which the trades were submitted. The clearinghouse,
at this point, would become a guarantor to the option purchaser's clear-
ing member, insuring performance under the option contract.169
The clearinghouse guaranty should constitute the most important
protection to domestic option customers. Because of this undertaking,
a customer would know that, although he may still bear the risk of
default or bankruptcy by his futures commission merchant, 170 he would
be relieved of the risk of default or bankruptcy by the option grantor.
The guaranty obligation issued by a clearinghouse would, of course,
necessitate certain procedures designed to protect the clearinghouse
from defaults by option grantors. While specific requirements for op-
tion transactions are only now being formulated by the domestic ex-
changes, certain basic elements should be involved.
The first necessary ingredient will be the posting of adequate mar-
167. 1978 House Appropriation Hearings 462. Even though London option premiums, except
on the London Metals Exchange, are determined at auction, there has been no competitive bid-
ding among the United States firms offering these options to the American investor. London
premium information has not been easily available to the investor, which has often meant that the
actual "premiums" or commissions charged have been greatly inflated. The fact that bidding will
occur on the United States exchanges and that premium information will be widely published
should enable the investor to determine whether he is getting the best price available.
168. Id.
169. The clearinghouse function should operate in the same way it does presently for futures
trades, except that the guaranty will be given in only one direction because of the unilateral nature
of an option contract. The clearinghouse will guarantee the grantor's performance to each option
purchaser.
170. While the option remains open and unexercised, the clearinghouse will most likely hold
an original margin deposit only from the grantor (since he is the only trading party with a market
risk at this point). The clearinghouse will then mark the position to market each day by compar-
ing the striking price of the option to that day's settlement price for the related futures contract.
Once the option is exercised, however, the clearinghouse will convert the unilateral option posi-
tion to a bilateral futures position in which margin deposits will be required of both buyer and
seller. These deposits will thereafter be marked to market the same as all other futures positions.
For a description of the mechanics of such a clearing system, see Highlights of Clearing System
for Commodity Options, StaffDocument on file with the Board of Trade Clearing Corp., Chicago,
Ill. As to the treatment of customer claims in the event of a commodity broker's bankruptcy, see
the special provisions contained in the new Title 11 of the U.S. Code, Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, §§ 761-766, 95 Stat. 2611-21.
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gins by option grantors to cover the potential risk of default. Presuma-
bly, such margins would be determined on the basis of the expected
volatility in the price of the underlying futures contract or physical
commodity, in a manner similar to the calculation of margins on fu-
tures positions.'71 The clearinghouse would then wish to make daily
adjustments in the required deposits (generally called "marking to mar-
ket") to account for any increased risk to the grantor resulting from
price movements in the underlying futures contract. This marking to
market would involve a daily comparison of the option striking price
with the daily closing or settlement price for the underlying futures
contract, and a corresponding call for additional deposits would be is-
sued when necessary to cover the difference.
The difficulty would arise when a grantor was unable or unwilling
to meet a demand for additional deposits. In such a case, the clearing-
house would have several options. It could take over the existing de-
posit and at the same time obtain a futures contract for its own account
to protect against further price exposure. Under its guaranty, the
clearinghouse presumably would be obligated to make good the differ-
ence between the price of the futures contract purchased and the
amount of the grantor's deposit. This procedure would have the ad-
vantage of providing substantial protection against the option guar-
anty, but it would have the disadvantage of exposing the clearinghouse
to losses under the futures contract that may exceed the amount of the
grantor's deposit. Another possible solution might be for the clearing-
house to transfer the option account to another clearing member who is
willing to accept it. If this could be accomplished, it would have the
effect of bringing the account "current" and allowing the normal mar-
gining process to continue.
Another means by which an exchange or its clearinghouse might
provide protection against grantor defaults would be to require that
each option contract be backed to some degree by ownership of the
underlying physical commodity or the requisite futures contract. While
it might be possible to require that options be backed 100% by the un-
derlying commodity or futures contract, this would require much
greater coverage than necessary to meet the actual market risk of the
grantor under each option. Rather, it should be possible to develop a
set of rules that would take into account any offsetting positions a gran-
tor might hold in the underlying commodity or futures contract and to
make an appropriate adjustment in the margin requirements for that
171. In the case of the ICCH in London, the deposit required of the grantor of an option is, in
fact, the same as that required for the underlying futures contracts. ICCH, Clearing for Commod-




2. Foreign Options. A more serious challenge to CFTC protec-
tion of option customers exists with respect to foreign options. There is
a great deal of variation in the practices and procedures of the different
London exchanges with regard to clearing trades, segregating customer
funds and requiring deposits and margins from option grantors. 7 3 The
Commission first indicated that it would require the foreign exchanges
to apply for approval of their contracts and procedures to insure ade-
quate and uniform protection of American option customers. 174 How-
ever, because of the strenuous opposition of London exchanges to the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Commission has revised its
proposal to impose requirements instead on the FCMs marketing for-
eign options in this country. With respect to options traded on the
London exchanges whose transactions are cleared by the ICCH, the
proposed regulations would require that the FCM be a clearing mem-
ber of the ICCH. 71 As to options traded on the London Metal Ex-
change (LME), the Commission would require that the FCM obtain a
standardized option contract between the customer and a ring-dealing
member of the exchange, obligating that member to guarantee per-
formance of all option obligations directly to that customer. 7 6
The reason for the Commission's concern over foreign options is
obvious. In the past, the problem with such options has not necessarily
been with the London exchanges or their members, or with the ade-
quacy of the safeguards provided by those exchanges.' 77 Rather, the
problem has been that the segregated premiums, margin deposits
and/or clearinghouse guaranties have not been available to satisfy the
claims of aggrieved customers in this country. Most, if not all, of the
American customers' accounts have been carried on an omnibus basis
with the London exchange members, and these customers have been
unable to trace their accounts in the event of insolvency of their
FCMs.18
172. The treatment of cross-trades by the ICCH might serve as a useful example of this treat-
ment. If a member has opposite option positions posted to its account, the clearinghouse recog-
nizes an offset with respect to the deposit requirements. This corresponds to the so-called "net-
margin" system currently used by a number of United States exchanges.
173. See note 35 supra.
174. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,540 (1977).
175. Id. 55,544 (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.7(a)).
176. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,554 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.7(b)).
177. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,541 (1977).
178. Id. 55,546. An "omnibus account" is one that is carried by an exchange clearing member
in the name of a nonclearing member FCM for which the principal owner or owners of the ac-
counts are not disclosed to the clearing member.
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To deal with this problem, the Commission has taken two steps.
First, it requires direct privity of contract between the American cus-
tomer and the firm for whose benefit the clearinghouse guaranties or
margin deposits exist. Second, it requires that foreign option customer
funds be segregated from all other funds. Moreover, the segregated
funds may not be used to offset the claims of a foreign exchange or its
clearinghouse against the FCM, that is, they may not be counted as a
margin deposit.17 9 These measures should greatly improve the degree
of protection afforded to American purchasers of London options. The
requirement of ICCH membership probably will reduce greatly the
participation of thinly capitalized, disreputable firms in the option
business. In addition to examining the financial stability of applicants
for membership, the ICCH has indicated that it will take into account
the membership of an FCM in a London Terminal Market Association
or a clearing membership on a major American exchange. 8 This indi-
cates an inclination on the part of the ICCH to admit only American
firms that have an established reputation and considerable financial
substance.
Options issued on the LME present more uncertainty with respect
to the stability of the FCMs offering them. While it is likely that the
ring-dealing members will exercise some discretion in choosing the
American firms with which they will deal, they will have far less con-
cern over the financial substance of those FCMs than does the ICCH,
which must rely directly on the American firms to meet their deposit
and guaranty obligations to the clearinghouse. Also, the ring-dealing
members will not be particularly concerned with the sales practices of
the FCMs, since they will have no liability to American customers ex-
cept for default under the option contracts themselves. The result may
be that small, undercapitalized and not necessarily reputable FCMs
will enter the foreign metal options market and will present regulatory
difficulties for the Commission.
The only reliable solution to this regulatory problem is to require
that LME options be cleared by an approved clearing mechanism.
During the course of the congressional oversight hearings, a representa-
tive of the commodity option industry recommended that a United
States clearinghouse be established to provide protection to American
customers purchasing foreign options. The suggestion was that such a
179. Id. 55,558 (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.16(b)). This provision may be modified some-
what in view of the provisions of the 1978 Act which would give the Commission discretion to
allow commingling of various types of customer funds.
180. See comments concerning the proposed further amendment of Interim Regulations on
Commodity Options Transactions filed with the CFTC on behalf of the London Commodity Ex-
change Company, Ltd. and the International Commodities Clearing House, Ltd. 12 (Dec. 2, 1977).
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clearinghouse could become an associate member of the ICCH and yet
be subject to full CFTC jurisdiction.' 8 '
While an American clearinghouse might work for ICCH-guaran-
teed options, it would probably fail for LME options. The reason is
that the ring-dealing members of the LME are not presently required to
post margin deposits on options they issue. Since most of the expected
volume in LME contracts would be call options purchased by United
States investors, there would very likely be no grantor willing to put up
margin funds with such a clearinghouse. Without those deposits, a
clearinghouse could not function, and unless a clearing mechanism or
its equivalent can be devised, such LME options might present insolu-
ble problems of consumer protection. In short, they should be banned.
3. Dealer Options. The possibility of dealer option trading
under the proposed pilot program presents a different set of concerns
with regard to customer protection. In fact, the Commission originally
proposed to ban all off-exchange trading, including dealer options, on
the theory that no clearing mechanism or its equivalent is available and
that supervision of trading practices would be difficult. I8 2
However, a suitable protection equivalent to that provided by a
clearing mechanism can be provided. Mocatta Metals Corp., for exam-
ple, has outlined for the Commission its own procedures and policies,
which are designed to insure performance of its option obligations. As
a clearing equivalent, Mocatta matches buyer and seller by issuing a
number designation for each option and provides for registration in
the ultimate purchaser's name, if requested. 8 3 It then segregates pre-
miums, and deposits in a separate account the daily marked-to-market
profit on all "in the money" options outstanding. 84 Mocatta guaran-
tees performance under each option granted, thus exposing its substan-
tial net worth to customer claims for default. 85
While the program outlined by Mocatta appears adequate to pro-
vide a substitute for clearinghouse protection, it is not clear whether the
181. 1978 House Hearings 428 (statement of Leonard Goldstein).
182. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,539-40 (1977).
183. See Comments Regarding Proposed Commodity Option Regulations Submitted to the
CFTC by Mocatta Metals Corp. 7-8 (Dec. 1977); Petition for Interim Rulemaking Before the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, filed by Mocatta Metals Corp. and Metals Quality
Corp. (May 11, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,023-25 (1978).
184. Comments, supra note 183, at 8.
185. Id. 9. Basically the same customer protection measures are followed by Dowdex Corp.,
the other principal commodity option dealer currently operating in the United States. See Peti-
tion for General Exemption from the Provisions of Regulation Section 32.11 of the Commission's
Regulations, filed for Dowdex Corp. with CFTC (April 24, 1978).
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Commission, as a matter of regulatory policy, should leave the details
of a performance guaranty system up to the party whose performance
is to be guaranteed. The Commission has taken the first step toward
developing a standard set of requirements for dealer option grantors by
setting out specific requirements in its temporary dealer option exemp-
tion for segregation of premiums, marking-to-market and minimum
net worth for a grantor.186 This approach has the advantage of estab-
lishing uniform requirements that apply to any firm that may engage in
granting dealer options.
However, such a system lacks the element that has made the clear-
ing system so effective for the futures markets: objectivity in determin-
ing and applying performance guaranty standards. Because of the
inherent conflict of interest that is present in a "clearing" system ad-
ministered by the option grantor, the functions of holding segregated
funds, marking-to-market and making demand for the posting of daily
option profits are better placed in an independent clearinghouse. 187
Establishing such a clearing system for dealer option transactions
presents obvious problems. It flies in the face of tradition, since metals
dealers, who have been the most active grantors of dealer options, have
not historically been required to clear option trades.18 8 Such a require-
ment has not existed previously because trading in commodities often
begins in a dealer market before there is sufficient demand to justify
exchange trading. 89 This means that there is too little volume to war-
rant a standardization of contracts, an inspection and grading system
for the underlying commodities, and a fixed delivery system. Certain
problems such as the availability of inspection and grading facilities
and the proximity to cash markets to facilitate delivery would require
solutions before implementing such a system.
The benefits of a clearing system possibly can be approximated if
grantor procedures are closely monitored by the CFTC. One approach
is to impose a high net worth requirement on dealer option grantors as
a substitute for the guaranty fund held by a clearinghouse.1 90 This sys-
186. 43 Fed. Reg. 23,707-08 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.12).
187. From a regulatory standpoint, the objectivity achieved by having an independent
clearinghouse is important. It assures that the group of people making determinations about the
amount of deposits necessary to insure performance are not subject to the conflicting desire to
minimize the demands on their own cash flow and to maximize their profits. This need for objec-
tivity, in fact, was the basis for the decision by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1925 to insist that
the Chicago Board of Trade establish a wholly separate and independent clearinghouse. See Chi-
cago Tribune, July 8, 1925, at 15, col. 1.
188. See note 35 supra (London Metals Exchange).
189. Oral testimony of Dr. Hendrik Houthakker before the Commission on May 26, 1977;
Comments, supra note 183, at 6.
190. See 43 Fed. Reg. 23,704-06 (1978).
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tern has a certain appeal since default under an option contract would
expose the grantor's entire net worth to damage claims, but such a sys-
tem also has a number of drawbacks. First, in a clearing system, con-
tract guaranties are backed by the clearinghouse guaranty fund which
is held in the highly liquid forms of cash, government obligations and
negotiable securities. The net worth of a grantor, on the other hand,
might exist in the forms of buildings, computer equipment, futures and
option positions, and other less liquid assets. Second, a clearing system
spreads the risk of default or insolvency among its clearing members
since the funds on deposit by each stand good for the others' con-
tracts.191 A dealer option grantor who defaults or goes bankrupt might
leave nothing behind to back up its guaranties beyond the customers'
own funds held in segregation.
Another major shortcoming of the grantor net worth approach is
that a fixed requirement cannot take into account the constantly chang-
ing volume of outstanding option obligations. If the net worth of a
dealer is viewed as a substitute for a clearinghouse guaranty fund, it
must somehow relate to the magnitude of the dealer's outstanding obli-
gations.1 92 As suggested by the Advisory Committee on Market Instru-
ments, a minimum net worth requirement should be set that would be
increased as open option positions created by the grantor increase. 9 3 It
may very well be that the volume of dealer option trading will diminish
after the pilot program is adopted. Presumably, the competition,
greater financial safeguards and reduced transaction costs provided for
exchange-traded options will make them more attractive to the general
public. However, to the extent that dealer options become widely sold
to the general public, the Commission should examine closely the pos-
sibility of requiring a sounder and more objective system for guaran-
teeing dealer option transactions.
Finally, it may be difficult to control the manner in which dealer
options are sold to the public. Whereas an exchange has a considerable
degree of authority to observe and regulate the conduct of its members,
a dealer option grantor does not have such control over the FCMs mar-
191. Some clearinghouses, like the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation, are separate stock
companies in which clearing members are required to purchase a number of shares commensurate
with the volume of their trading activity. Since the clearinghouse guarantees all trades, both to the
buyer and to the seller (or, more precisely, to the buyer's clearing member and to the seller's
clearing member), this paid-in capital stands as the financial backup for all trades cleared. The
margin account of a clearing member, on the other hand, is separate from the clearing corpora-
tion's capital-account, and it stands as a security deposit for the trades cleared through that clear-
ing member. See discussion of clearing procedures in T. HIERONYMUS, supra note 159, at 40-43.
192. With clearinghouse stock, for example, the amount required to be paid in by each clear-
ing member is a function of the volume of trading done by that member. See note 191 supra.
193. ADVISORY COMMIT'EE REPORT 46.
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keting its options. The more substantial dealer option firms have had
some success in developing customer protection programs with which
their FCMs have agreed to comply.' 94 However, since these dealers
lack the manpower and enforcement capability of the exchanges and
the investigative powers of the CFTC, it is clearly more difficult for
them to police the selling of their options. While the Commission pre-
sumably will require that any FCMs selling dealer options to the public
must meet the minimum capital requirements and the consumer pro-
tection rules applicable to FCMs generally,'95 the policing of FCMs
selling dealer options will undoubtedly add to the Commission's regu-
latory burdens.
One solution would be to require that any FCM offering and sell-
ing dealer options to the public must be a member of one of the futures
or option exchanges. This would ensure that the firms dealing with the
public would be subject to the continuous auditing and surveillance
procedures of an exchange that would provide a better system of moni-
toring than the Commission is presently able to provide. Because of its
possible anticompetitive aspects, such a requirement would have to be
evaluated carefully by the Commission. However, in view of the major
difficulties the Commission has experienced in protecting the public in
off-exchange option transactions, such a requirement would seem justi-
fied. 19 6
The climate for commodity option trading should be substantially
improved under the pilot program. Exchange supervision of trading
and clearinghouse guaranties for exchange-traded options will lend to
options the same types of financial protections that have guarded the
194. See, e.g., Comments, supra note 183, at 11.
195. Under the revised minimum financial requirements published on September 8, 1978, all
FCMs offering to sell options are required to maintain a minimum "adjusted net capital" of
$50,000 if they are members of an exchange or $100,000 if they are nonmembers. This financial
"cushion" will provide an element of protection to customers over and above the financial protec-
tion provided by the segregation of customer funds under section 32.16 of the Part B regulations
and, in the case of domestic options, by the clearinghouse guaranty. Such new minimum financial
requirements should provide substantially more protection to option customers than has existed
under the interim regulations. See 43 Fed. Reg. 39,956-82 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §
1.17).
196. Under 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1976), the Commission is required to "endeavor to take the least
anticompetitive means of achieving the objectives of [the Commodity Exchange Act] .. ..'" Id.
However, the Commission has interpreted this as a requirement merely to give consideration to
the antitrust implications of its actions and not as a limitation on its authority to regulate. In
implementing this interpretation, the Commission has imposed a higher minimum financial re-
quirement on FCMs that are not exchange members, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,972 (1978) (to be codified in
17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(l)), and has provided a dealer option exemption even though it had deter-
mined that only a single grantor could meet its requirements. 43 Fed. Reg. 23,706 (1978).
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futures markets for many decades. The implementation of independ-
ent clearing procedures for foreign or dealer options should also pro-
vide safer investments for the public. The competitive bidding of
exchange option premiums, the rapid dissemination of premium infor-
mation on all options and mandatory disclosures should virtually elim-
inate the abuses that have characterized off-exchange option trading.
Despite the magnitude of past difficulties in providing customer protec-
tion, the Commission should be able to structure its program to avoid
most of the problems with which it has been plagued in the past.
C. Effect of Option Trading on the Underlying Futures Markets.
Probably the least predictable result of domestic option trading is
the effect it will have on activity in the underlying futures contracts.
Since so little empirical evidence is available, it is virtually impossible
to anticipate all of the types of problems that may result.
The volume of option trading as compared to that in the underly-
ing futures is a matter that can only be learned from experience. In the
1934 study, the Department of Agriculture estimated that privilege
trading on the Chicago Board of Trade was equivalent to about fifteen
percent of the trading in grain futures.' 97 In the case of the London
commodity exchanges, although no precise figures are available, it has
been estimated that option trades constitute well below five percent of
the transactions in futures.' 98 The general view of the London ex-
changes has been that option trading as a whole has performed the
useful economic functions of attracting additional funds to the futures
markets and of adding flexibility in spreading risks, and that it has not
had a negative effect on futures trading.199
It seems unlikely that option trading would have the effect of de-
creasing activity on the futures markets. Since option contracts are in a
sense derived from futures contracts, they cannot exist without an un-
derlying futures market. Most commentators have expressed the view
that option trading will increase the volume of futures transactions,200
197. MEHL 10, 77.
198. 1974 House Hearings 179 (statement of Maurice Stockdale).
199. Id.
200. See id. 267; 1974 Senate Hearings 547; BEAN, BOWER & Co., THE EcONOMic ROLE OF
TRADED OPrIONs 26 (1977). The effect of option trading on the futures markets would probably
be greatly different if the options were assignable from one holder to another. This would lead to
the existence of a secondary market in which option holders could liquidate their positions outside
the context of the futures market. Most analysts have recommended strongly against allowing
options on futures contracts to be assignable because of the possible impairment of both option
and futures market liquidity. See, e.g., ADViSORY COMMITrEE REPORT 2-3. This option assigna-
bility is to be distinguished from the tranxferabiliO, of options on an option exchange, which would
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the reasoning being that option grantors will be inclined to enter into
futures contracts to hedge their option obligations, and that option pur-
chasers who exercise their option rights will first obtain a futures con-
tract from the grantor and then will enter into an offsetting futures
contract to liquidate the position. In addition, an option holder may
also enter into a futures transaction to hedge his option position.20 1
One possible problem that may arise is congestion in the delivery
month of a futures contract. If the volume of profitable options out-
standing is large, it may be difficult to exercise and offset the resulting
futures position because of the large number of parties needing to liqui-
date their positions. If the condition is severe, there can be an artificial
impact on the price of the underlying futures contracts, and it may be
difficult to liquidate those contracts.
The primary means for dealing with congestion is to set the expira-
tion dates of option contracts a sufficient length of time prior to the end
of a delivery month to allow the option position to be liquidated before
the final few days of the futures contracts. In the case of London op-
tions, for example, option contracts normally expire two to four weeks
before the expiration of the underlying futures contracts.2 °2 On the
American exchanges, however, options on futures should expire before
the first notice day in the delivery month for the underlying futures
contract. In this way, options can be liquidated prior to the trading
session in which the related futures contracts can be exercised, thereby
avoiding any major congestion problems.
The area of greatest concern over the effect of option trading will
be its potential for market concentration and price manipulation.
Though the details of privilege trading in the nineteenth century are
largely unavailable due to the lack of trading records, it has never been
disputed that privileges were used to manipulate, if not to corner, cer-
tain markets.20 3 The danger of market concentration remains a serious
concern, and the prevention of excessive concentrations constitutes per-
haps the highest regulatory duty of the Commission.2 °4
Some progress has been made since the 1860s. The most critical
factor will be that option trading will now be conducted on the domes-
allow an option holder to transfer his contract or to offset by entering into another transaction on
the exchange. Id. 27.
201. 1974 House Hearings 267 (statement of John Clagett).
202. BEAN, BOWER & Co., supra note 200, at 42.
203. The 1934 Department of Agriculture study revealed the amassing of large positions
through privileges in the several years prior to the great wheat market crash of 1933. MEHL 45-52.
See also Ferris, The Great Corner, FARM Q., Spring 1966, at 106.
204. Some feel that preventing such market concentrations is really the only proper role for
the Commission. See 1978 Senate Hearings 468 (statement of Dr. Hendrik Houthakker).
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tic exchanges and, probably more importantly, on the same exchanges
that trade the underlying futures contracts. This will allow the ex-
changes to do what they could not do in the last century-that is, to
monitor the open positions of each trader, both as to options alone and
as to option and futures positions in the same commodity. Thus, the
exchanges will be able to monitor and, if necessary, control large open
positions in the marketplace.
Manipulation of prices for cash commodities or futures contracts is
a felony under the Commodity Exchange Act,2°5 and violation of the
speculative limits imposed on different futures contracts constitutes a
misdemeanor.2" In addition, the Commission proposes a twenty-five-
contract reporting limit with respect to any given option position. 7
However, in order to control market concentration effectively, the
Commission must relate the limit on options to any related futures po-
sition in the same commodity. While the Commission has indicated its
interest in removing the speculative limits in favor of another
formula,208 its restrictions on large positions should take into account
the relationship of futures and option positions.
So many unknown factors exist in the absence of actual experience
in domestic option trading that it is impossible to develop a persuasive
hypothesis regarding the impact of such trading on futures markets.
Economic developments over the next few years may well have an im-
pact on the types of persons engaging in option trading and on the
volume of their activities. Whatever the actual experience under the
pilot program, however, the Commission should develop thorough in-
formation-gathering systems and procedures for analyzing that infor-
mation so that economists can measure the actual effects that option
trading may have on the futures markets.
V. STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR THE PILOT PROGRAM
The proposed pilot program in its present form has not determined
with sufficient specificity the appropriate standards for evaluating the
resulting option activity. However, it should be obvious that the data
205. 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
206. Id. § 13(c).
207. 42 Fed. Reg. 55,562 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 32.21(c)). The Commission has
admitted that this limit is arbitrary and may be changed in light of actual market experience under
the pilot program. CFTC Staff Memorandum, supra note 142, at 12.
208. The Commission has proposed abandoning the traditional "position limits" in favor of a
rule requiring each contract market to limit the position of any member in a maturing futures
contract to not more than 25% of the open interest in that contract unless the contract market
determines that the holding of a greater position would not adversely affect trading in that con-
tract. (This is commonly referred to as "Charlie's Rule.") 43 Fed. Reg. 15,438-41 (1978).
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collection to be implemented by the pilot program in an attempt to
determine the economic benefits of commodity option trading will
amount to an exercise in futility in the absence of appropriate stand-
ards for evaluating such data. As discussed above, the focus of data
gathering under the pilot program will be on economic purpose, pro-
tecting consumers and determining the effect on futures markets. It fol-
lows that the review standards should have the same focus.
A. Economic Purpose.
In its evaluation of actual trading experience under the pilot pro-
gram, the Commission should not view economic purpose as solely in-
volving the motivation of particular option traders, but rather should
examine the larger economic impact of this activity. Even if all option
traders turn out to be purely speculators or investors, valid economic
purposes can be found if such trading reduces the amplitude of price
fluctuations on the underlying commodity futures markets or causes a
general reduction in food prices or the costs of other consumer items. 20 9
The Securities and Exchange Commission, in contrast with the CFTC,
has not required that stock option trading involve more than an occa-
sional hedger. 10 Rather, the SEC has taken note of the fact that option
trading can have substantial speculative aspects and has merely under-
taken to monitor trading to see that it does not have an adverse impact
on the securities markets.211
There is also a danger in asking the question of economic purpose
in too small a forum. Obviously, if the Commission were to measure
the economic benefit of option trading by its effect on the Commission's
own budget, the pilot program would be sure to fail. If commodity
options are actively traded under the pilot program, by whatever party
and for whatever purposes, that should certainly evidence the existence
of economic benefit to someone. In analyzing this issue, the Commis-
sion must decide which economic purposes it will recognize and how it
will measure each one.
In any case, concentrating solely on the motives of market partici-
pants is too restrictive. It ignores broader, but no less legitimate, eco-
nomic considerations. Instead of focusing on whether commodity
209. See BEAN, BOWER & Co., supra note 200, at 10, in which a noted English firm recom-
mended that the CFTC take account of the price stabilizing effects of option trading under its
"economic purpose" test.
210. See SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 228, at 4 (Aug. 30, 1968), [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 77,603; SEC Report on Put and Call Options 2
(1961).
211. See Gates, The Developing Option Market: Regulatory Issues and New Investor Interest,
25 U. FLA. L. REv. 421, 432 (1973).
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options are used primarily for speculative or other purposes, the Com-
mission should conduct its evaluation in terms of the three levels of
economic concern discussed above: first, whether options are useful to
individual market participants in terms of investment, protection of
other assets (such as futures contracts or physical inventories)21 2 or as
devices which facilitate futures trading (for example, as stop loss or-
ders);213 second, whether option trading has a beneficial effect on the
cash or futures markets in terms of increasing liquidity or reducing
price fluctuations;2 4 and, finally, whether option trading plays any role
in reducing consumer prices on items involving the commodities
traded.215 If an economic justification for option trading can be found
under any of these rationales, and if it can be determined that no
significant negative impact is imposed by such trading on the price dis-
covery and risk allocation functions of the commodity futures markets,
this author feels that an acceptable economic purpose will have been
found.
B. Consumer Protection.
The proposed pilot program will present the Commission with a
valuable opportunity to test the effectiveness of its new regulatory re-
quirements in protecting the public from fraud and deception. In judg-
ing the success or failure of its new requirements, the Commission
should consider seriously the use of domestic options as a standard
against which to measure the sales practices relating to foreign and
dealer options. For example, one measure of the unfair advantage
taken of unsophisticated investors is the excessive markups that have
been charged on London options in the past.216 By comparing infor-
mation about premiums and commissions charged for foreign and
dealer options with those charged for domestic options, the Commis-
sion should be able to determine whether the off-exchange options
present an undue hazard to small investors. Second, the Commission
should monitor the percentage of foreign and dealer option sales that
are made by FCMs unaffiliated with any domestic exchange or the
ICCH. If a great proliferation of nonmember FCMs occurs under the
pilot program, the Commission should scrutinize their activities very
closely. Finally, the Commission should conduct frequent and careful
audits of any nonmember FCMs that are allowed to engage in option
212. See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
213. See text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 126-28 supra.
215. See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
216. See note 40 supra.
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sales. If it appears that the requirements set forth under the pilot pro-
gram (particularly those relating to segregation of customer funds) are
not being observed, the Commission may wish to reexamine its regula-
tory plan.
C. Effects on Underlying Futures Markets.
In the absence of a thorough economic analysis, it may be impossi-
ble to prescribe specific standards by which the impact of option trad-
ing on futures markets can be judged. However, the Commission
should take certain factors into account in making a judgment as to this
impact. First, it should examine the effect of option trading on liquid-
ity in the futures markets. While the experience of the London ex-
changes indicates that option trading will not constitute a large
percentage of the transactions involving a particular commodity, the
Commission should establish a program for measuring the effect of op-
tion trading on liquidity in each underlying futures contract.217 A sec-
ond factor to be examined is the possibility of congestion in the
liquidation of either futures or options. As discussed above,218 the
careful timing of expiration dates in option contracts should minimize
or perhaps eliminate this problem with respect to futures, but the ex-
changes and the Commission should be alert to possible problems of
congestion in the liquidation of option positions and the effect that such
liquidation may have on prices in the underlying futures contract. Fi-
nally, it will be necessary for the Commission to establish a system for
obtaining information about the combined futures and option positions
of individual traders and for determining the level of concentration
that threatens a market. This should be relatively easy regarding op-
tions traded on the same exchange as the underlying futures contracts.
However, if options on physicals or options on markets other than
those trading the underlying futures are allowed, the Commission will
have a more difficult task in obtaining the requisite information. So
long as the proper information can be obtained, however, the Commis-
sion will have a means of determining whether options are being used
to influence artificially or to manipulate futures prices.
217. Not all parties agree that a reduction in trading volume in futures would be a bad result.
See Comments of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, supra note 118, at 14. Such a reduc-
tion might indicate that options are a superior trading instrument for some purposes. However, an
impairment of liquidi y in futures trading (Le., an insufficient number of buyers or sellers at any
given price and time) that results in an inefficient or disruptive price discovery process would be a
more serious concern for the Commission.




Commodity option trading has had a long and turbulent history in
the United States. Beginning with the "grain gamblers" of the 1860s
and continuing through the London option and "naked" option
schemes of the 1970s, this history has been rocked almost constantly by
moral outrage and scandal. In fact, there have been so many attempts
to ban options altogether that it is remarkable they have survived at all.
Somehow, in one form or another, commodity options have shown an
amazing resilience.
The early difficulty with options (in the form of privileges and in-
demnities) was that they were neither banned nor controlled. The offi-
cial attitude of "looking the other way" allowed options to realize their
worst potential. There is little doubt that options were used by the
grain speculators of the late nineteenth century to amass huge positions
in a given commodity with which they could either manipulate prices
or comer the market. The exchanges, which had the responsibility for
guarding against such activities, were powerless to control options be-
cause they could not monitor the trading. Had options been recognized
officially and subjected to the system of margins and clearinghouse
guaranties that applied to futures trading, this history might have been
totally different.
Over a century later, commodity option trading was again tainted
by scandal. Neither subject to regulation by the domestic exchanges
nor effectively regulated by state or federal securities agencies, the sale
of commodity options was the object of widespread abuse. Again, the
difficulty can be traced to the fact that commodity options were not
traded on organized exchanges, and, therefore, customers were not pro-
tected by the time-tested safeguards of the boards of trade. Because of
the extremely rapid expansion of the commodity option business, even
the newly created CFTC, with its tremendous arsenal of jurisdictional
reach and enforcement powers, could not provide an adequate substi-
tute for exchange supervision. The result was that commodity options
once more achieved their worst potential.
Commodity option trading now stands either at the final curtain or
at the beginning of a new act. Thanks to the extensive scrutiny of op-
tions given by Congress in its 1978 oversight hearings, the regulatory
problems have been clearly identified. However, despite the incessant
difficulties in controlling option trading, there seems to be a renewed
confidence in their economic potential. It could be that finally, after a
century of doubt and suspicion, commodity options will be given a le-
gitimacy that they have never before enjoyed.
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The CFTC seems to have chosen the best regulatory course-to
adopt a program allowing option trading on domestic exchanges. In
this author's opinion, only the commodity futures exchanges can pro-
vide the constant surveillance and monitoring of options that will avoid
the problems of manipulation and fraud, while at the same time al-
lowing options the maximum freedom to fulfill their natural economic
potential in the marketplace.
One danger in the expected program for option trading is that it
may be designed too narrowly to allow the basic forces of the market-
place to function and to permit options to reach their fullest economic
capacity. Clearly, the CFTC has been charged with the serious respon-
sibility of preventing further harm to American citizens as a result of
option trading. The best way in which the Commission can perform
this task, however, is to follow the system that has worked so well for
futures trading: allow the exchanges to formulate market instruments
and trading rules, and give the CFTC a right to approve contracts and
rules and to monitor the exchanges. The CFTC has yet to formulate
the economic standards, information goals and evaluative procedures
to insure that its test will be valid. The Commission's success in com-
pleting this aspect of the proposed pilot program will also determine, to
a substantial extent, the success or failure of this important test.
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